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SupportingPolicies for
Exchange Control Regimes
Inthe years since 1931, Chile has utilized a large number, of policy tools to
support the exchange-rate systems presented in the previous chapter. In this
chapter, the evolution of those policies is described. An awareness of such
developments is important because the levels of EERs, EER(PI)s, and EPRs
depend upon how the NERs are adjusted for the impact of such policies.
4.1 IMPORT POLICIES
Some general characteristics of these policies must first be noted.
i. A wide range of import policies has been used in Chile because the
administration was attempting to restrain imports in a disequilibrium system at
the same time that it was pursuing a number of objectives not connected with
the balance of payments.
ii. Owing to the attempt to maintain a disequilibrium system with an
overvalued exchange rate, cyclical fluctuations have occurred in the extent of
restrictiveness of the import control system and the degree of its complexity.
When favorable external conditions have prevailed and the exchange rate has
not been too far below the long-run equilibrium level, the import control
system has been relatively simple. Once external conditions have deteriorated
and the PLD-NER has declined under pressure of inflation combined with a
fixed NER, the system has been made much more complex and restrictive in
response to ex ante balance-of-payments deficits.
iii. Because of this pattern, a number of policy tools that initially were
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introduced to liberalize and rationalize the system subsequently were altered
in their basic character and used to make the system more restrictive and
specific. The prior-deposit system on imports, for example, was initiated in
1956 with liberalizing and rationalizing intents. As the liberalization attempt
faltered in 1957 and 1958, however, prior-deposit requirements were raised in
order to limit imports and were made more varied in order to discriminate
more among different imports. Therefore, in the next liberalization attempt,
the additional tax was imposed to replace the prior-deposit system. When that
liberalization attempt failed, prior deposits were reinstituted and the additional
tax was maintained. Next, the added additional tax was introduced with the
same intent, but eventually prior deposits, the additional tax, and the added
additional tax were all three in effect.
iv. Some major policy changes have been associated with the switches
from phase to phase which are delineated in section 1.4 above.
v. Most policy changes have been small, ad hoc adjustments made in
response to specific problems that have arisen in the disequilibrium system or
to concerns other than those related to the balance of payments. Those
changes often have been very specific in their impact, which probably has
increased distortions. Overriding general motives for the increased restrictive-
ness have included export pessimism and the desire for greater national con-
trol over the Chilean destiny, both of which have strong roots in the cata-
strophic experience of the Great Depression (see section 1.3). The motivation
for many of the detailed policy alterations, however, has been the desire to
limit short-run inflationary effects and to alter income distribution or to favor
a particular interest group.
vi. Taxes have always been an important part of the foreign-sector
regime. Because of accumulative effects they have often been quite high. They
have not been very flexible, however, in response to changing conditions. They
also have not been used to absorbing the entire import premium (see sub-
section 5.1.1). In fact, some taxes have been fixed in domestic currency, with
the result that they have absorbed less of the premium as inflation has oc-
curred. For example, Leftwich [1966:405J estimates that the ad valorem
equivalent of the average specific tariff rate was 70 per cent in 1935, but
declined to approximately 30 per cent by the late 1930s because of inflation.
Also the tax of 0.015 escudos on foreign-exchange transactions was equivalent
to more than 9 per cent when it was first applied, in 1954, but declined to the
equivalent of less than 2 per cent by the time it was abandoned, in 1957.
vii. Quotas have been utilized with varying degrees of intensity since
1931. Nonprohibitive quotas, however, have not generally been an integral
part of the regimes since 1955, except in 1965. The system utilized in that
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effects (e.g., penalizing rapidly growing industries and encouraging collusion).
3d When nonprohibitive quotas have been in effect, the recipients of premiums
generally have been the traditional traders, since allocations have been made
• on the basis of past import patterns. Complete prohibition has been used to
in provide protection to a changing group of industries.
viii. Delays and time constraints have been widely utilized to regulate
short-run foreign-exchange disbursements, especially at times of foreign-
tat exchange crises.
ix. Prior deposits on imports have been the major policy tool since they
he were introduced in 1956. At times of foreign-exchange shortages, such de-
ed posits have been raised to prohibitive levels on many items and the whole
structure has been altered to favor specific mass-consumption necessities.
• During the more liberalized phases (i.e., 1959—61 and 1965—70), the prior-
deposit system was gradually eliminated, only to be reintroduced abruptly
?in with the abandonment of the liberalization attempt. r x. A large number of exceptions to the general regime have always been
in force: special regimes, bilateral trading and compensation arrangements,
as exemptionsfor government agencies, and regional accords. These exceptions
have tended to become more important during less-liberalized phases (al-
fl- though many of the special regimes were established during the Phase III and
a- Phase IV years of 1956—61). Such exceptions have been quite important at
On times in terms of the proportions of total imports covered. They have caused
to considerable distortions and have substantially weakened the capability of the
Dr Central Bank (and related agencies) to operate a consistent exchange-control
system.
4.1.1Tariffs and Related Indirect Taxes.
0- Law 4321 of 1928 established the legal basis for specific import tariffs
for the next four decades. Before the institution of exchange control, in mid—
1931, the President had used the power delegated to him by this law to raise
in the rates significantly (i.e., by the end of 1930, increases averaging 71 per cent
on the 73 per cent of imports affected—and further increases were made in
1. March 1931). Subsequent modifications in the early 1930s included, in 1932,
tt a rise of 10 per cent in the rates for luxuries (primarily as a revenue measure);
IC in1933, a 50 per cent increase in all duties to counterbalance devaluation; in
1934, a 100 per cent gold surcharge to replace the 50 per cent increase of
1933; and in 1935, an increase in the gold surcharge to 300 per cent because
• of further devaluation.
Ad valorem duties on the landed price, i.e., c.i.f. price plus all other duties
• and costs of clearing goods into the country, were added in 1936, 1941, and86 EVOLUTION OF EXCHANGE CONTROL REGIMES IN RECENT DECADES
1942. In 1943, Law 5786createda structure which was maintained until
1967: 3 per cent on prime necessities, 30 per cent on ordinary consumption
goods, and 62 per cent on luxuries.
By the early 1940s the system had become somewhat complex, and the
sum of customs and landing charges had become quite large. Ellsworth
[1945:50] provides an example for an automobile tire with c.i.f. value of
0.605 escudos (1 escudo =1,000pesos) in early 1942:
Basic duty 0.300
Warehouse charge (4 months) 0.018
Embarkation and disembarkation charges (Law 3852) 0.002
Statistical duty 0.02 12
Additional duty (Law 4851) 0.030
Port fiscal duties 0.005
Total 0.3744
300 per cent gold surcharge 1.1232
1.4976
Ad valorem tax (Law 5786) 0.1959
Total 1.6935
It is evident that the nominal protection in this case is very high because of the
multitude of charges and the accumulative effects of the surcharge and that
the ad valorem tariff adds significantly to the final price.
No other major revisions of import tariffs were made before 1959. The
piecemeal modifications which were introduced, however, generally tended to
increase the explicit tariff-equivalent, for example: (i) As mentioned earlier,
from 1954 through 1957 a tax of 0.015 escudos per dollar (equivalent to 9.4
per cent initially) was collected on all exchange transactions classified as not
for necessities. (ii) At the end of 1955 the exchange-rate base used to calcu-
late customs costs in domestic currency was switched from that of the previous
half-year to that of the previous quarter. (iii) In 1956, a tax of 1 per cent was
introduced on all sales of foreign exchange. After being increased to 5 per
cent, reduced to1 per cent, and increased to 2 per cent, this charge was
abolished in 1959. (iv) In 1957, special import taxes on vehicles were
established.
In 1959, Law 13305 altered the tariff structure in a major way by im-
posing an additional tax (impuesto adicional) of from 5.0 to 200.0 per cent of
the c.i.f. value for six import categories, payable in United States dollars. This
tax was intended gradually to replace the prior-deposit system (see subsection
4.1.4, below) so as to rationalize the regime. At least until May 2, 1960, an
amount equal to the additional tax had to be placed on deposit with theSUPPORTING POLICIES FOR EXCHANGE CONTROL REGIMES 87
Central Bank (and transferred to the Treasury) at the time when the import
was registered with the Foreign Exchange Commission. When the import
arrived, the deposit was applied against payment of the additional tax.
During the Phase IV period of 1959—61 the list of imports for which addi-
tional taxes were due in lieu of prior deposits was steadily expanded. The
maximum additional-tax rate remained at 200.0 per cent, although the mini-
mum was lowered to 0.1 per cent, and new categories were established. In
May 1960, a small number of goods was shifted to lower additional-tax
categories.
After the reversal to a Phase 11 regime, in 1962, the additional-tax rates
were increased substantially in each category: in the formerly tax-free cate-
gory, rates were imposed of from 5 to 30 per sent; rates of 10 to 30 per cent
were raised to 100 per cent; rates of 50 per cent, to 100 per cent; and rates of
75—100 per cent, to 200 per cent. The maximum limit also was raised from
200 to 400 per cent in November 1962. In February 1963, many of these
increases were reversed by the Ministry of Finance, apparently in an attempt
to offset partially the inflationary impact of the devaluation of late 1962.
In November 1964, one of the first acts of the new Frei government was
to institute an added additional tax (impuesto adicional agregado) ranging up
to 300 per cent of the c.i.f. value. The government then eliminated the previous
legal link between increases in additional and added additional taxes and re-
ductions in prior deposits. Consequently, the former taxes could be changed
independently of prior-deposit requirements. Subsequently, the Ministry of
Finance modified these tax rates for many commodities. The most important
modification, in June 1966, was a reduction of the additional and added addi-
tional taxes on machinery imports: declines from about 90 per cent to 1—10,
20—30, or 50 per cent for industrial machinery; from 90—100 per cent to 20
per cent for agricultural machinery; and from 6 per cent to 1 per cent for
mining machinery.
In January 1967 Law 16464 replaced Law 4321 of 1928 as the basic
Chilean tariff legislation and instituted a major rationalization. En the new law,
the simpler Brussels nomenclature was adopted, a 5 per cent charge was
established on items previously exempted from tariffs, and the multitude of
previously existing taxes 1wasconsolidated into specific taxes defined in terms
of 0.183057 grams of gold-equivalent per unit and ad valorem taxes on the
c.i.f. value.
Some changes were made after January 1967 which were directed toward
further rationalization. The most important one, made in August 1969, was
that tariff charges generally were increased by 5, 10, 20, or 35 per cent to
replace prior deposits of 15, 40, 90, or 180 per cent. However, most subse-
quent changes were of a much more ad hoc nature, as the following four cases








)88 EVOLUTION OF EXCHANGE CONTROL REGIMES IN RECENT DECADES
been established at 1.0 per cent in 1969) was increased to 2.0 per cent in 1967
and to 3.0 per cent in 1969. (ii) In July 1967, the percentage of ad valorem
customs charges on capital goods paid out of the proceeds of foreign loans was
reduced by twenty points for goods imported before the end of the year. (iii)
In January 1968, ad valorem duties on all private imports (including those
previously exempt, except for specified foodstuffs and specified commodities
covered by international agreements) were raised by five percentage points.
(iv) In September 1968, ad valorem duties on capital goods were reduced in
proportion to the length of the repayment period for foreign credit obtained
by the importer.
4.1.2Quotas,Licenses, Foreign-Exchange Budgets, and Permitted Lists.
Integral to the attempt to partition the foreign-exchange market were
explicit quantitative restrictions limiting access to import subdivisions of that
market. Decree Law 138 of July 1932 (superseded by Law 5202 in July
1933) inaugurated the system of import quotas and licenses. The initial pur-
pose of this system was to conserve foreign exchange by rationing and other
means. Soon it was also used for other ends: to bring pressure on other
countries with exchange control systems in hopes of promoting Chilean ex-
ports (e.g., to force Peru to buy Chilean exports; import quotas on Peruvian
sugar were limited); to redistribute income by subsidizing "necessities" and
prohibiting "luxuries"; and to provide additional protection(e.g.,in the
1930s for flat glass, light bulbs, calcium carbide, jute bags). The Import
License Commission (established in October 1933) determined the allocations
of quotas and licenses primarily on the basis of past patterns, with some
modifications in response to political influence. The Exchange Control Com-
mission administered the system. The recipients were largely traders.
At times quotas exceeded available foreign exchange; as a result, by 1939
large quantities of goods were being held in customs because no foreign ex-
change was available. Therefore, the requirement was added that imports
receive an additional permit before the goods were shipped to Chile. The
institutional arrangements subsequently were rationalized somewhat through
the establishment, in 1942, of CONDECOR; the establishment, in 1945, of
an annual foreign-exchange budget; and the 1950 reform of CONDECOR
and of the foreign-exchange budgeting system, which temporarily allowed the
importation of certain machinery, raw materials, and replacement parts at the
free-market rate without prior authorization.
During the Phase II period of 1931—55, nevertheless, the underlying
pattern of operation remained the same. First, an attempt was made to make
the system more rational and unified by setting up a fixed or controlled ex-
change rate for a significant proportion of international trade. Then, becauseSUPPORTING POLICIES FOR EXCHANGE CONTROL REGIMES 89
of internalinflation and lagsin exchange-rate adjustments, balance-of-
payments crises occurred and the foreign-exchange budget was exhausted. In
response, ad hoc measures were implemented: the suspension of licensing for
some import or exchange-rate categories (especially luxuries and the gold and
wine rates); the piecemeal reclassification of goods to higher rates; and the
ad hoc reduction of permitted lists of imports. As a result of these modifica-
tions the system remained as complex as it had been initially.2
With the introduction of a Phase III regime in 1956, arrangements were
altered significantly. In August 1956, Law 12084 abolished the previous sys-
tern with its specific quotas in the foreign-exchange budget and its import
licensing. Under this law, there was established a fairly broad list of goods
which could be imported freely by any economic entity upon payment of
duties, taxes, and the prior deposit without licenses, except for a few items
which required a certificate of necessity from the Ministry of Economics. The
newly established Foreign Exchange Commission proposed the original list of
permitted imports and subsequent modifications to the Ministry of Finance,
which enacted the same by decree. The permitted list generally was expanded
throughout the period, although occasionally items that had formerly been on
the list were excluded from it.
Early in the Phase IV period of 1959—61, further liberalizations were
introduced. In April 1959, Decree 5474 of the Ministry of Finance expanded
the permitted list to include almost all commodities (although those not pre-
viously included were subject to a 5,000 per cent, 90-day prior-deposit re-
quirement). At the end of 1959 the permitted list effectively was expanded to
all imports by making the 3,500 per cent prior-deposit category applicable to
all items not mentioned explicitly on the permitted list.3 A few exceptions to
the generally less restrictive system existed: government agencies were still
required to obtain permission from the Ministry of Finance for nondefense
imports; a quota of 200 vehicles for use as taxicabs was fixed in August 1959;
and from July 15 to August 9, 1961, a prohibition was imposed on non-
domestically transformed re-exports, which remained in effect for the rest of
the year for scrap iron. But generally the regime was the least restrictive one
imposed since the Great Depression.
The reversal in 1962 to Phase II policies was accompanied by new
import bans. In January 1962, Decree 41 of the Ministry of Finance prohibited
the importation of about 700 items considered to be nonessential or in suffi-
cient production in Chile. Application had to be made to the Central Bank for
permission to import goods remaining on the permitted list. Approval was
usually granted automatically, but sometimes there were considerable delays.
Early in the Frei regime, restrictions were tightened because of foreign-
exchange shortages and impending foreign-debt payments. In January 1965,
Law 16101 empowered a Central Bank committee to reject import applica-
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tions for any commodity group for which total import applications during any a
month exceeded by more than 5 per cent the average monthly import registra- s
tions of the past twelve months for that group. When applications for any
commodity were rejected, those for all other commodities in the same customs y
tariff category had to be rejected. Between January and November 1965, such I
power was used to reject $92 million of import applications.
This new procedure had a number of negative effects:(i) Relatively
rapidly growing industries and activities were penalized. (ii) Holders of rela-
tively large inventories within a particular category were favored, since they n
could submit very large requests and count on pressure from their competitors ii
to ensure eventual acceptance without themselves incurring substantial relative c
costs because of delays. (iii) Inventory accumulation in excess of actual needs E
was encouraged because of concern that future dollar applications would not n
be approved. (iv) A certain random element was introduced into the process
in that an "unreasonably" high request for dollars would have to be approved
if it did not exceed the allowable limit for that month. But the same request (or
a "reasonable" one) might be rejected if it was made in a month in which the 4
criterion was not met. (v) Collusion was encouraged among firms in an indus-
try in their attempt to ensure that total requests from that industry would not
exceed the allowable limits. (vi) Control by other government agencies over 4
allocation of approved applications within a tariff category had been sur- 1'
rendered in order to avoid charges of favoritism. (vii) Discrimination occurred
against items with large seasonal fluctuations. (viii) Very costly delays were S
introduced, especially in regard to spare parts. (ix) The review committee was 1
subjected to considerable political pressure for approval of certain applica- 1
tions.4
Such defects soon became apparent to the authorities. Almost immedi-
ately modifications were made so that spare parts worth up to $500 were I
exempted from the need for prior approval. Once the immediate foreign-
exchange crisis had passed, rejections of import applications were less and less S
frequent. After February 1966 the whole procedure was no longer used.
Throughout the Frei years the permitted list of merchandise imports con-
tinued to be used. Initially this list was reduced because of the immediate I
foreign-exchange crisis. In early 1965, for example, 49 items were removed.
Later in that year, however, the list was expanded, especially for machinery
and medicine. This expansion continued over the next several years and then S
accelerated during the last two years of the Frei administration.5 In January
1970, a Presidential Decree provided for the gradual (so as not to cause b
undue transition problems) elimination of virtually all import restrictions with a
the intents of limiting special advantages to imports from LAFFA; encourag-
ing greater domestic efficiency by eliminating undue protection, but retaining
the possibility of higher protection for one or two years for infant industries; PSUPPORTINGPOLICIES FOR EXCHANGE CONTROL REGIMES 91
and using indirect taxes on luxuries instead of the import regime to limit con-
sumption of items deemed socially undesirable. Throughout the rest of the
L year, a large number of items were added to the permitted list. By late in the
• year, virtually the only items not included were automobiles, television and
• radio receivers, cigarettes, guns, jewelry, alcoholic beverage, carpets, and toys.
The Allende government made no general changes in the use of the
permitted lists and related tools. During the first two years of this government,
however, a large number of specific modifications were made which discrimi-
nated against luxuries,8 favored mass-consumption imports, and on balance
increased the number of permitted items. Many of the added items, however,
carried a prohibitive prior-deposit requirement of 10,000 per cent. The Central
Bank included them on the permitted list because exceptions could be made
more readily from the prior-deposit requirement than from the permitted list
for imports generally deemed undesirable, but in specific cases judged ad-
vantageous.
4.1.3TimeConstraints on Foreign-Exchange Cover for Imports.
In some times of foreign-exchange shortages, informal delays in the
r delivery of foreign-exchange cover for imports increased, for example, in the
first half of 1964 (Ffrench-Davis [1971:88]). The 1965 procedure for ob-
taming approval of import applications, which is described in the previous
subsection, also had the effect of pushing foreign-exchange needs forward by
increasing processing lags, even though the procedures announced in January
1965 limited the period between receipt and acceptance or rejection of any
application to 90 days.
•- Forthe same purpose at other times such delays were formally introduced.
In 1958 lags of 20 and then 30 days were instituted as the Phase III regime
faltered because of exchange shortages. In the subsequent Phrase IV period
such lags were reduced, in 1959, to 15 days after shipment for imports from
Western Hemisphere countries and in 1961, to the date of arrival of the
shipping documents. At the start of the Phase II period of 1962 the Central
Bank reintroduced a compulsory deferred payment period of 90 days, which
was increased to 120 days in September of that year. This deferment period
remained in force through 1965. Given the lags in other steps of the procedure,
such as in the consideration by the authorized Central Bank committee of
whether to accept or reject applications, in that year 265 to 315 days elapsed
between the initial presentation of an application by an importer and the
actual transfer of foreign exchange. The compulsory deferment period subse-
• quently was reduced in small steps until it was eliminated in 1969.
• The lag in delivery on sales by the Central Bank to commercial banks
provided another time constraint on the availability of foreign exchange. Under92 EVOLUTION OF EXCHANGE CONTROL REGIMES IN RECENT DECADEST
theFrei government of 1965—70, for example, this lag ranged from 56 to 82
days, with its peak occurring during the foreign-exchange shortage of late
1967.
Yet another time restriction was introduced in December 1965. Under
Central Bank Circular 590 exchange for specified imports had to be purchased (
at the bank future rate corresponding to the full registration value to provide t
for immediate cash payment in local currency within 60 days after shipment
(which was reduced to 30 days in October 1967). From January 1966 p
through January 1967, more commodities were added to the list covered by
this circular until approximately 80 per cent of private-sector imports were p
included. For much smaller lists of commodities similar restrictions with maxi- ti
mum time periods of 120, 240, and 360 days also were established in 1967 i'
and1968.
From the point of view of importers, all these time constraints could
result in higher costs. For example, if no part of the cost of the delay was SI
borneby exporters, a 120-day delay implied an increase of 2 to 3 per cent in
the real c.i.f. cost of Chilean imports. From the point of view of the Central
Bank the primary purpose of these constraints, as noted above, was to push
forward foreign-exchange requirements in times of shortages. Several of these
time constraints were also introduced, however, to absorb domestic liquidity
as part of anti-inflation programs.7 I
r
4.1.4Prior Deposits on Imports.
V
In1956 CONDECOR introduced a new tool into the set of Chilean ti
foreign-sectorpolicies in the form of import prior deposits. Such deposits have
been among the most important and most altered measures in the regimes Ii
from that time to the present. S
The original system included 30-day prior deposits in domestic currency I
on goods imported on a consignment basis (5 per cent deposit), goods im-
S
ported on a deferred basis (amount of downpayment), and goods imported
f:
on a cash basis. Goods in the last group were divided into six categories. Some
examples of the goods included in each category are given below, with deposits I.
specified as percentages of the c.i.f. values:
Category A (5 per cent): cellulose, raw rubber, crude oil, wheat, Paraguayan
tea, sugar, lubricants, gasoline, kerosene
Category B (50 per cent): sewing machines, wool tops, cotton, coffee, e
asbestos, chassis for trucks and buses, buses, tires, spare parts for motor d
vehicles i.
Category C (100 percent): most antibiotics, chemicals, paraffin wax, plastic p
raw materials, tubes, newsprint, business machines FSUPPORTING POLICIES FOR EXCHANGE CONTROL REGIMES 93
82 Category D (150percent):tin plate, films
ate Category E (200 per cent): pickup trucks
Category F (400 per cent): glassless station wagons
Capital-goods imports and imports by large-scale mining enterprises and by
the public sector were exempt from the prior-deposit requirements. Banks
were allowed to sell foreign exchange only in the amounts specified on the
prior-deposit certificates.8
b At first the use of this new tool implied a substantial liberalization of im-
ports with the same general order of priorities as before, but without the ex-
treme discrepancies among goods. There also was an initial, one-shot anti-
167 inflationary impact as the new system absorbed substantial credit.
Subsequently, however, as the escudo became more overvalued and
foreign-exchange reserves declined, the prior-deposit system was modified sub-
stantially. In 1957, three new categories were established:
in Category G (600 per cent): automatic scales, photographic equipment, etc.
Category H (1,000 per cent): pineapples, poplin, elastic fabrics, aircraft,
buses, etc.
ese Category! (1,500 percent): spices, locks, trucks, automobiles, etc.
tity
In 1958 the minimum deposit period was increased to 90 days,° the percentage
required for imports on consignment was increased to 100, almost all items
were shifted upward among categories, and a new category was established:
Category 1 (5,000 per cent): automobiles, station wagons, buses, pickup
trucks, jeeps, typewriters, calculators, etc.
As a result of these major modifications in 1957 and 1958, as well as a
host of minor ones, the basic character of the prior-deposit system was sub-
stantially altered. Changes were made more and more on an ad hoc basis.
C)' Discrimination among goods increased because of the spread in the rate
structure and the differences in the deposit periods. Alterations ocurred quite
ed frequently. Favoritism of specific products became more rampant. Some prior
ne deposits became almost prohibitively high.1° The whole system became much
its more restrictive.
In the Phase IV years of 1959—61, the dominant tendency was to reduce
dependence on prior import deposits by substituting additional taxes in their
place. A parallel tendency was to lower deposits on those items for which they
were still required. In 1959, for example, deposits were first reduced and then
eliminated on deferred payment imports, and all imports carrying prior-
r deposit requirements of 150 per cent or more were moved to lower categories,
i.e., from 150 to 100 per cent, from 600 to 400 per cent, from 1,500 to 1,000
per cent, from 5,000 to 1,000 per cent, and from "not permitted" to 3,500
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tions among categories and in the percentage rates for various categories. In
November 1961 prior deposits on most imports were abolished.
One major anomaly, however, was introduced into the prior-deposit sys-
tem in this period. In August 1960 imports of all used merchandise were made
subject to a prior deposit of 5,000 per cent on the c.i.f. value of equivalent
merchandise in unused condition. Although lower rates were established in
January 1961 for certain construction items and boats, the strong general dis-
crimination against the importation of second-hand machinery and vehicles
precluded their profitable use as an alternative to new goods.
Another important change in the prior-deposit system in this period was
the shift from payment in domestic currency to payment in dollars or in gov-
ernment bonds denominated in dollars. Near the end of 1958 the Foreign Ex-
change Commission sanctioned prior-deposit payments in short-term Treasury
dollar bonds or in dollars in addition to domestic currency. In March 1959 the
commission eliminated the eligibility of domestic currency for such purposes.
Subsequently it permitted use of medium-term Treasury dollar bonds and
obligations of the government debt finance agency (Caja de AmortizaciOn de la
Dueda Püblica). The motivations for these changes were twofold: to lessen
the domestic currency liquidity of banks as part of the change toward a more
restrictive monetary policy and to shift command over resources to the central
government, since the dollar prior deposits were held by the Treasury, not by
the banking system (which held prior deposits in domestic currency).
The reversal to a Phase II regime during the foreign-exchange crisis of
December 1961 was initiated by the imposition of a 10,000 per cent prior-
deposit requirement on all items. For most items deposits were reduced from
these prohibitive levels early in 1962, but a system then was established of
90-day prior deposits in fiscal bonds at rates ranging from 10 per cent to 10,000
per cent of the c.i.f. value of imported merchandise.'1 Ffrench-Davis [1971:86]
and Jeanneret [1971 : 150] report that the limited number of eligible bonds
effectively constrained import applications. The scarcity rent on the bonds was
as much as 30 per cent (which accrued, of course, to the bond owner and not
to the government). Later in this phase the restrictiveness of the deposit re-
quirements was slightly reduced.
At the start of the Phase III period of 1965—70, prior deposits in fiscal
dollar bonds were replaced by escudo deposits equal to the value of the addi-
tional tax plus the added additional tax. At the same time commercial banks
were prohibited from directly or indirectly financing prior deposits. The pur-
poses of these changes were to transfer to the fiscal sector the rents previously
received by dollar-bond owners without affecting the cost of imports for im-
porters; to rationalize the system by preparing the way for the elimination of
the additional and added additional taxes; and to redirect credit from com-
merce to "directly productive" activities.L
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In During the first four years of this phase, a number of alterations were
made which increased the restrictiveness or specificity of the system. Such
modifications provided added protection for domestic production of a number
of particular items.
• Theclearly dominant trend throughout this phase, however, was toward
simplification of the system and reduction of its impact. After the exchange
• crisisof 1965, items were frequently reclassifiedto lower categories or
•les exempted from the prior-deposit requirements; as a result, the importance of
prior deposits declined steadily.12 In 1967 the number of categories was re-
duced to six (10, 20, 50, 100, 200 and 10,000 per cent). After September
1968, prior deposits could be released ant used to pay import duties and other
import charges instead of being blocked for at least 90 days as was previously
•\,ry the case (therefore reducing the need for double financing). In 1969, the
percentages of the deposits were reduced in four steps from 10 and 20 to 0,
from 50 to 15, from 100 to 30, and from 200 to 50. On July 30, 1970, all
prior-deposit requirements were eliminated except for the prohibitive 10,000
Ia per cent category.
The demise of prior-deposit obligations once again was of short duration.
Less than a month after taking office, late in 1970, the new Allende government
established prior deposits of 10,000 per cent for refined sugar, cigars, pipe
• tobacco, tinplate, commercial aviation aircraft, certain rayon yarns and fibers,
merchant ships, fishing vessels, and navigational equipment. This broadening
of of the use of prohibitive prior deposits was relatively minor in scope, but it
represented a definite reversal from the prevalent trend of the previous phase
of reducing the use of this policy instrument. In April 1971 (Central Bank Cir-
of cular 1508), moreover, the 10,000 per cent prior-deposit requirement was ex-
tended to over 60 per cent of the import categories included on the permitted
• list. Subsequently the coverage of this requirement was steadily expanded. The
ds only significant exception to this new trend was the exclusion of parts from the
as requirement of a 10,000 per cent deposit and prior Central Bank approval.
Thus, prior deposits were the major means on the import side by which the
government attempted to create a buffer between the international and do-
mestic economies and to increase government control. The increase in the
use of prohibitive import prior deposits was the most important single policy
change in the move to a much more restrictive foreign-sector regime.
ks
4.1.5SpecialRegimes. 13
- Importpolicies have been further complicated by a number of exceptions
•øf to the general rules. The most significant probably have been those explicitly
•
- recognizedas "special regimes." These usually have accorded favorable import
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regimes in the early 1960s is indicated by the fact that they affected 41 per cent
of total imports in 1961. Further evidence of their importance at that time is
the estimate by Beca, Galvez, and Imperatore [1969:136] that in 1962 cus-
toms duties actually collected were only 43.4 per cent of what they would have
been had the legal rates applied to all imports, with special regimes accounting
for about 80 per cent of the shortfall. The special regimes declined in relative
importance during the 1960s, but still affected 18 per cent of imports in 1969
and 1970.
4.1.5.1SPECIAL REGIMES FOR PARTICULAR REGIONS.
These accounted for 30 per cent of the value of imports under special
regimes in 1961 and 74 per cent of such imports in 1970. The motive for
establishing these regimes was to achieve better integration of remote areas of
northern and southern Chile into the national life. The four major areas cov-
ered, in order of the value of imports affected, are the following:'5
Arica.In 1953 Decree Law 303 established a special regime for the
department of Arica.16 This regime is described in some detail because it has
been the most important of all of the special regimes and it has served as a
prototype in a number of respects for the other regional regimes.
As of 1961, special provisions for this department included: exemption
from indirect taxes for industries; exemption from customs duties on imports
of raw materials and capital and a single customs duty of 10 per cent on other
products with an additional duty of 15 per cent for some luxury goods; a sys-
tem of drawbacks on the exportation of products assembled or produced in
Arica; a special credit system (not subject to the general margins established
by the Central Bank) for all industrial enterprises that used only raw materials
produced in the area; a 90 per cent reduction in profit and real-estate tax rates
for all new industries established in 1959—69; and a geographical monopoly
for the Chilean automobile industry.
Movement of goods from Arica to the rest of the country was governed
by the general trade regime with the following exceptions: (i) Once in every
six months, tourists in Arica could take out goods worth about $40 in duty
without paying the duty and goods worth up to about $110 in duty on payment
of only the specific and ad valorem charges. (ii) Goods produced in Arica and
not produced in the rest of the country were subject to only one-half of the
specific and ad valorem duties on the import content and were exempt from
additional taxes and prior deposits. (iii) Goods produced in Arica and also
produced in the rest of the country (but in inadequate quantities in the judg-
ment of the Ministry of Economics) were subject to 7.5 per cent of the specific
and ad valorem duties on the imported component and were exempt from
additional taxes and prior deposits.
In the 1962—64 period import privileges for Arica were restricted, andSUPPORTING POLICIES FOR EXCHANGE CONTROL REGIMES 97
almost all imports on the general prohibited list were subjected to a 200 per
cent additional tax if imported into Arica. At the same time the government
effectively created a category of otherwise prohibited luxury imports which
could be imported only into areas such as Arica and which could be shipped
to the rest of the country only if processed or assembled in the special regions.17
During 1965—70 some attempts were made to integrate the special regimes
into the over-all trade regime as part of the general trade liberalization. In
1966 a tax was applied on all imports otherwise exempt (but much of this tax
was eliminated in March 1968). Also in 1966 the Central Bank was given the
authority to adjust the approval of import registrations for the television re-
ceiver, automobile, and sewing machine industries in Arica to the need to
r stimulate the development of similar industries elsewhere. In late 1969, regu-
lations were changed so that any new items on the permitted list imported into
Arica were subject to 80 per cent of the normal tax and prior-deposit require-
ments instead of the previous 25 per cent. After August 1970 import duties
and taxes were applied to all but specified classes of goods when imported into
•
Arica for local use.
a Under the Allende government, attempts were made to remedy part of
the perceived regressive income impact of the Arica regime. The government
therefore immediately instituted a requirement that goods be certified by the
appropriate government ministry before they could be imported into Arica.
r Shortly thereafter it required that importers seeking to benefit from the special
regime for Arica establish that they had resided there without interruption for
least three years.
Despite modifications under the Frei and Allende governments, Arica has
s remainedthe most important of the special-regime areas. In 1971 it accounted
for over a third of the value of total approved special-regime import applica-
tions. It has continued to provide a means for evading at least part of the
general trade regime apparatus. It also has continued to be the home of some
of Chile's most inefficient industries.
Provinces of Chiloé, Aysen, and Magallenes.In 1956 Law 12008 es-
tablished a special regime for these three very isolated southernmost provinces
t of Chile. The area was exempted from import duties on all nonluxury products.
The reshipment of imports to the central part of Chile was made subject to the
same rules that applied to the department of Arica. In 1958, motor cars,
whiskey, wine, beer, and cider were reclassified as nonluxury goods for this
purpose aiid thereby freed from the restrictive quota on luxury imports into
this area. Thereafter changes in this regime generally paralleled those for
Arica.'8
• Provinces of Tarapacá and Antofagasta and Department of Chanaral.
• In 1958, Law 12858 established a special regime for these northern areas. It
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not in sufficient production to supply the local demand, in order to compensate
in part for the impossibility of substantial agricultural production in these
areas because they are located in the Atacama Desert.
Northern Area.Also in 1958 Law 12937 established a special trade
regime for the northern departments of Iquique, Pisaqua, Tattal, and Chanaral
(except for the El Salvador copper deposits) and for all small- and medium-
scale copper mining in the province of Antofagasta. Under this regime, all
productive enterprises in the area were exempted from import duties and prior
deposits on capital goods, fuels, and raw materials (with normal customs duties
for reshipments to other areas); a special credit plan was established for in-
dustrial enterprises that exclusively used raw materials produced in the area;
and a system of drawbacks was instituted for products assembled or produced
in the area.
4.1.5.2SPECIAL REGIMES FOR PARTICULAR INDUSTRIES.
Individually, the value of imports covered by these regimes generally has
not been as large as that for regions. However, the value of imports coming
under (i), below, was second only to that of the department of Arica at times
in the 1950s and early 1960s. The value of imports under the special regime
for the nitrate industry (see subsection 4.2.2) also was substantial over a long
period of time. The following were among the most important special regimes
for industry.
i. In 1944, under Law 7896, exemption from all taxes, including customs
duties and profit taxes, was granted to the then new (and only) enterprise
producing iron and steel ingots (CompanIa Acero de PacIfico; CAP).
ii. In 1950, under Law 9618, total tax exemption (including customs
duties) was granted to the then newly established National Petroleum Enter-
prise (Empresa Nacional de Petróleo; ENAP).
iii. Also in 1950, under Law 9839, exemption from customs duties was
granted for imports of machinery destined for agriculture, small- and medium-
scale mining and fishing, and new industries at least 80 per cent of whose raw
materials were of domestic origin. In 1953, Decree Law 208 expanded the
special regime for the fishing industry, with broad tax exemptions, special im-
port privileges, and the right directly to use its own foreign-exchange proceeds.
Further provisions, favoring fishing and ancillary industries, were added in
1960and 1961.
iv. In 1956, under Law 12084 the sugar industly was granted total
exemptionfrom import duties on beet-refining machinery in order topromote
domesticself-sufficiency in sugar production.19
v. In 1960 Decree Law 255 established a special regime to promote the
modernization of the coal industry. Accelerated depreciation was permitted,
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and equipment under CORFO-approved investment programs, all customs
duties on industrial or domestic coal-using equipment, profit taxes on profits
reinvested in CORFO-approved plans, and production taxes in the coal-mining
• industries.
4.1.6Bilateral, Compensation, and Barter Agreements.
• These three forms of agreement constitute a second important class of
exceptions to the general international economic regimes of Chile. After foreign
credits were frozen, in 1931 (see subsection 4.3.3), a number of importers of
Chilean nitrates threatened retaliation. As a result, compensation agreements
along the following model were signed with a number of countries.
• Two compensatory accounts with fixed, but different, exchange rates, "A"
for new business and "B" for frozen credits, were established in each country.'°
In Chile, foreign nationals paid debts in Chilean currency into the B account
at the Central Bank. A fixed percentage of the value of nitrate exports (and
sometimes other exports) was paid for out of these deposits. Upon arrival of
the nitrates in the importing countries, this same percentage of the sale was
paid into local B accounts and transferred to creditors whose Chilean credits
had been frozen. Commodity imports from the partner country provided de-
posits for the Chilean A account which were used to compensate nitrate ex-
porters for the part of their shipments not paid for from the B account. In the
partner country, credits to the A account came from proceeds of imports from
Chile and disbursements were made to exporters to Chile."
Thus, distinct bilateral exchange rates were in effect with each partner
country." Since these rates were not adjusted regularly to offset relative price
changes, large sums often accumulated in the Chilean or partner country's
compensation account. For example, in 1933 Chile had a large positive balance
Is infrancsin the A account for the agreement with France. In order to avoid the
penalty for not utilizing this balance within the allotted period of time, Chile
w triedto induce more imports from France by lowering the escudo price for
francs from this account, by allowing such francs to be used for previously
excluded luxuries (e.g., champagne, wine, silk, cognac, and perfumes), and
by promising that French francs would be made immediately available for all
In imports from France.
The first bilateral agreement was signed with France in 1932. Before a
ii decade had passed, official compensation agreements had been made with
Belgium, Germany, Holland, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. Private compen-
sation agreements (in which generally only the proceeds for nitrates were
e blocked) had been made with Austria, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, and Italy.
•1, Barter arrangements also had been established with Argentina, China, Costa
y Rica, Ecuador, Finland, Guatemala, Japan, Peru, Sweden, and the USSR. The100EVOLUTION OF EXCHANGE CONTROL REGIMES IN RECENT DECADES
trade value of these agreements in the 1930s was evidently significant: Baer-
resen [1966:6] estimates that they covered 30 to 40 per cent of total Chilean
1
trade in the mid-1930s; Wilson [1937] estimates that in 1936 such agreements
covered 60 per cent of Chilean imports and 25percent of Chilean exports. I
A large number of such agreements continued into the 1950s, and new
ones were signed until near the end of that decade. With Chilean liberalization
11
attempts,initiated in 1956 and in 1959, and concurrent worldwide liberaliza-
11
tionefforts, the importance of these arrangements declined. In 1963, the last
agreement then in operation expired. The Allende government, however, had





A third group of exclusions from the general foreign-sector regime are
11
thoseenjoyed by various government agencies, in part to permit independent
fi action by specific government entities, especially government trading and
development agencies. At times exemptions also have been granted to the 0
governmentin general.
4.1.7.1SPECIFIC GOVERNMENT-AGENCY EXEMPTIONS. e
A number of government trading and development agencies were estab-
lished in the 1930s to provide better regulation of international trade and to
guide economic development.
Petroleum distribution is an example of an area in which government
trading agencies became involved. In 1932 Law 5124 introduced a state
monopoly on petroleum imports. Later that year Decree Law 519 established
price fixing and rationing for petroleum. Neither law, however, had much im-
mediate impact (although the latter was used for rationing in 1942). There-
fore in late 1934 the Compafiua de Petróleo de Chile (COPEC) was formed to
share petroleum trade with subsidiaries of the Shell and Standard Oil compa-
$
nies, and has continued in that role ever since.
1
TheAgricultural Export Agency (Junta de Exportación AgrIcola), estab-
lished in late 1930, is an example of a combined trading and development
agency. This organization subsidized agricultural production and exportation r
and set minimum agricultural prices. More specifically, in 1933 it established
export bounties for oats and barley. In 1934—35 it was empowered to export
and import wheat, to fix prices for wheat and related products, and to invest
in export-related agricultural production. In 1935 it introduced export bounties
for wine.
A number of pure development agencies also were created in the early
• -. .. •I
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1- 1930s (and some in the 1920s), although with very limited funding: Caja de
Crédito Agrario, Instituto de Crédito Industrial, Caja de Crédito Minero,
Instituto de Fomento Minero e Industrial de Tarapacá y de Antofagasta, and
the Caja de Colonización AgrIcola. These organizations became much more
W important in the 1940s when they were able to obtain more money through
mandatory Central Bank loans at nominal rates of interest of from 1.0 to 4.0
percent.
Law 6334 of 1939, however, established by far the most important of
the development agencies: CORFO (Corporación de Fomento). The new
Popular Front government evidently was able to have the necessary legislation
passed only because it was linked to relief for the great earthquake of January
1939. In any case CORFO was given broad powers and ample financial re-
sources. In subsequent decades, it became the most important single agency
in the policy of substantially increased government economic intervention.
re Functionally CORFO basically was (and still is) an investment bank. It
financed investment primarily through loans and stock purchases and legally
was instructed to use improvements in the standard of living and in the balance
of payments as its investment criteria.
CORFO's power originated in its substantial financial resources which
enabled it to control over 30.0 per cent of the imports of machinery and equip-
ment in each of ten years in the period between 1939 and 1954 and more than
25 per cent of public investment and more than 10 per cent of total investment
to in all but three years (1945—47) of the same period. The sources of CORFO's
finances included the government, through initial access to funds previously
allocated by law to the Caja de Amortización, increased income taxes ear-
marked for CORFO including a 15 per cent additional tax on the profits of
d large-scale copper mining, and general-purpose contributions and loans from
general revenues; the banking system, through loans, sometimes obtained on
CORFO's behalf by the central government; the general public, through stock
o sales; returns from earlier investments; and foreign official credits, including
$17 million from the Export-Import Bank in 1939—40 and a total of $969
million from foreign sources up to 1969.23
In recent years CORFO has continued in its primary role as an invest-
It ment bank. It has also expanded its activities in planning and in plan imple-
mentation. An example of the latter function is provided by the 1967 require-
ment that subjected authorization of import licenses for specified capital
imports to the approval of CORFO. Under the Allende government the scope
It of CORFO was further increased, especially in overseeing the large expansion
of the state sector in commerce, finance, and production.
The power which CORFO has had since its inception has resulted in a
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at times has lessened the capability of the Central Bank, and of related ex-
organizations, to create and pursue a consistent over-all foreign-
sector strategy.
4.1.7.2GENERAL EXEMPTIONS.
Exemptions granted to the government and quasi-governmental organi-
zations have centered on the prior-deposit requirement for imports and on
related taxes, i.e., the additional and added additional taxes mentioned in sub-
section 4.1.1. Such privileges have been inversely related to the degree of
over-all liberalization. They were reduced in the 1959—6 1 and 1965—70 phases
and increased in 1962—64 and after 1970. In restrictive phases these exclusions
have substantially favored the recipient institutions over the rest of the
economy.
4.1.8Regional Agreements.
In the 1960s, Chile became party to two regional agreements, which have
resulted in increased trade under special arrangements.
In early 1960 Chile signed the Treaty of Montevideo which instituted
the Latin American Free Trade Association or LAFTA (Asociación Latino-
americana de Libre Comercio; ALALC). The signatories agreed to eliminate
gradually all barriers to intraregional trade over a twelve-year period. Decree
22220, issued by the Ministry of Finance in 1961, established the Chilean
national list of imports from LAFTA countries with special specific tariff rates
and exemptions from ad valorem taxes, prior deposits, charges for embarkation
and disembarkation, and consular charges. Subsequent acts extended LAFTA
in some limited respects. In late 1965 complementary agreements were signed
for the exchange of automobile components with Argentina and Mexico. A
LAFTA multilateral clearing arrangement became effective in mid-1966. Un-
der the Allende government a number of bilateral trade and credit agreements
with other LAFTA nations were initiated (e.g., credit agreements with Uru-
guay and Peru in March 1971, with Paraguay in April 1971, with Mexico in
January 1972, and with Brazil in February 1972). Chile's national list was
revised biennially.
Progress was much slower than had been originally hoped for, however.
Agreements were difficult to make. The share of LAFTA in Chilean trade re-
mained constant in the last half of the 1960s. Moreover, in 1969, as part of
the over-all trade liberalization program, some of the previous discrimination
in favor of LAFTA countries was reduced. Prior-deposit requirements for
third countries were eliminated in cases in which imports from LAFTA ex-
ceeded $30 million, and the lists of permitted imports were expanded to in-
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However, in part because of the apparent stagnation of LAFTA, the Frei
ex- government took an active role in the promotion of the Andean subregional
group throughout the period of its formation which was initiated by the Bogota
agreement of August 1966, right through to the signing of the final accord, in
1969, by Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. This agreement had as
its aim the creation by 1981 of a free-trade zone, common external tariffs, and
1111- uniform policies.
The Allende government continued to encourage the development of
Andean economic relations. In mid-1971 a common investment code was
established to regulate foreign capital movements, royalties, licenses, patents,
and brand names. In 1972, the Andean group reached a decision on how to
allocate 73 industrial divisions among the five member countries, thus passing
what many observers had considered the most difficult test for this relatively
new trade-aid-investment grouping.24 Moreover, when the list of goods subject
to the requirement of a 10,000 per cent prior-import deposit was greatly ex-
panded, in April 1971, imports from LAFTA and from the Andean group
ave were exempted. As a result, effective preferences for imports from regional
suppliers becamefairly considerable.
pate 4.2 EXPORT POLICIES
Major features of Chile's export policies include the following:
i. The over-all export regimes have not been as complicated as the import
rA regimes because total export value is mainly concentrated on just a few
Led products.
A ii. For the same reason, major changes in the over-all export regimes have
often not coincided with major revisions of the import regimes.
iii. Over the long run, control over the most important export source,
large-scale copper mining, has shifted steadily (albeit with short-run reversals)
in from the foreign-owned copper companies and the U.S. government to the
Chilean government. This process culminated in the nationalizations of 1971.
iv. For the first quarter-century after the Great Depression, large-scale
rer. mining was subject to a curious combination of very unfavorable NERs for
local costs and very favorable NERs for imported components. Moreover, at
of that time and up until nationalization, returns on foreign-owned factors of
production and amortization were practically unregulated.
or v. Quantitative restrictions generally have been imposed on specific ex-
• portproducts only at times of domestic supply shortages. Most commonly, the
restricted products have been agricultural in origin.
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given to nitrates, the former queen of Chilean exports but long a faltering
industry. This example suggests that not only vested interests created by
import-substitution policies but also those created by export-promotion policies
may be difficult to ignore once they are entrenched.
vii. Export-promotion attempts have accelerated in recent phases, but still
have had limited coverage and probably have not compensated for the dis-
equilibrium NER policy (see section 5.2). Most of the limited resources in-
volved in such programs, moreover, has been used to subsidize industries for
reasons other than their export potential.
4.2.1Large-Scale Copper Mining.
In the 1930s, copper reclaimed from nitrates the position it had held be-
fore the War of the Pacific as the dominant Chilean export. Since 1931, the
output of large-scale copper mining has accounted for over half of Chilean
exports. In 1934, the Chilean share of world copper production also exceeded
20 per cent for the first time in more than half a century. The resurgence of
copper occurred almost entirely among theforeign-owned,large-scale
companies.
Prior to the Great Depression—and especially before the income tax law
of 1925—government policy toward large-scale copper mining had been
almost nonexistent. In the Phase II quarter-century from 1931 to 1955, how-
ever, government policy favorable to the industry was expanded considerably,
and numerous policies were specifically tailored for this industry. Major tools
included the multiple exchange-rate system, taxes, international price agree-
ments, and a Chilean copper sales monopoly.
Exchange-rate policy had four basic components:
i.Dollars for local production costs were converted into domestic cur-
rency at the official NER, which remained constant at 0.0 1937 escudos per
dollar from 1937 on (colunm 1 in Table A.7). The amount converted was
called the legal cost of production. It supposedly reflected actual production
costs. But the annual determination of legal costs of production included an
element of bilateral bargaining between the government and the companies
because of the ever-greater incentive for the companies to reduce domestic
currency outlays. The increase in this incentive is clear from the decline in the
official PLD-NER—from 7.900 escudos per dollar in 1939 to 0.256 in 1955
(column 1 in Table 3.2).
ii. Dollars for local costs of new investment were converted at the official
NER until 1948, at the bank spot NER of 0.043 escudos per dollar from 1948
through 1950, and at the provisional 0.060 NER thereafter. After 1947 a
higher NER was allowed for these expenditures than for local labor and vari-
able inputs in hopes of encouraging capacity expansion. As a result, the decline
Sn
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in the PLD-NER for such investment costs was not as great as for local operat-
ing expenses, but it still was quite substantial (columns 1, 7, and 10 in Table
3.2).
iii. Direct taxes and imported inputs and investment goods were paid
for in dollars without any government intermediation. The incentive to use
imported inputs (including labor paid in dollars) in place of domestic inputs
increased tremendously because of the above-mentioned declines in PLD-
NERs for domestic currency expenditures.
iv. Except for local purchases and taxes and while under the sales mo-
nopoly discussed below, the foreign-owned large-scale mining companies
generally were not required to return their proceeds to Chile. Payments for
foreign-owned factors, thus, were unregulated. In this respect these companies
enjoyed a unique position among Chilean exporters.
Taxes on large-scale copper mining were increased steadily in this quarter-
• century. Direct taxes were the most important in magnitude, but other taxes
also were significant. A sampling of relevant tax-rate changes illustrates the
steadily increasing tax burden. In 1939, Law 6334 added a 15 per cent tax for
the use of CORFO. In 1940, Law 6457 raised the fourth-category income tax
to 9 per cent on mining plus 6 per cent on companies incorporated outside of
Chile. In 1941, Law 7145 instituted a 3 per cent surcharge to both relevant
components of the fourth-category income tax. In 1942, Law 7160 established
an additional tax of 50 per cent on any added income due to increases in the
price of copper beyond the base levels established by the same law. In 1944,
Law 7750 introduced a temporary fourth-category income tax of 2 per cent
for two years. In 1952, Law 7160 increased the additional-tax rate from 50 to
60 per cent. In 1954, Law 11575 imposed a 30 per cent surcharge. The em-
ployee contributions to the social security system, moreover, were increased in
several steps from 16.43 and 3.1 per cent in 1940 for white- and blue-collar
workers, respectively, to 34.36 and 34.20 per cent in 1955.
Copper price agreements were in effect in 1942—46 and in 1950—52, al-
though not at the instigation of the Chilean government in the latter case. In
1942 the Chilean and United States governments signed a wartime agreement
which lasted until the end of 1946. This agreement fixed the price of copper
at 12 cents per pound and waived the United States tax of 4 cents per pound
on Chilean copper going to the United States government
In 1950, because of the Korean conflict, the U.S. Office of Economic
Mobilization unilaterally set the price of copper at 24.5 cents per pound. The
failure even to consult with Chile (in contrast to the 1942 price fixing) caused
major indignation there. Because of this reaction a conference was arranged,
resulting, in 1951, in the Washington Treaty, which established a three-cent-
per-pound surcharge for the Chilean government; excluded 20 per cent of
large-scale mining copper production from the price ceiling; set up a wage
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bonus for production increases; and conferred United States credits for imports
of machinery and equipment for domestically owned small- and medium-scale
copper mining companies. Despite this temporary resolution, the arbitrariness
with which the United States had acted left a bitter taste.
In 1952, in response to the 1950—51 copper-price-fixing experience, Law
10255 was enacted. It superseded the Washington Treaty and established the
Chilean monopoly on copper sales. The Central Bank was authorized to set
quotas on copper exports from large-scale mining companies and to buy copper
from them at the New York price of 24.5 cents per pound for resale at 35.5
cents per pound, with all profits credited to the Treasury. In 1953 the inter-
national copper market weakened considerably owing to the termination of the
Korean War, but the Central Bank continued trying to apply the same policy.
The result was that large stocks accumulated, most of which were sold at world
market prices at the end of the year. In 1954, international copper market con-
ditions further deteriorated. The government announced its intention of selling
to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. However, a (coincidental?) pur-
chase of 100,000 tons for the United States government stockpile in March
reduced the backlog. Soon thereafter the Chilean government abandoned its
sales agency.
By the 1950s dissatisfaction with the large-scale copper mining companies
was considerable and widespread. From the point of view of the companies,
the trade regime had limited the control of their operations, reduced the returns
from their investments, and made maintenance of market shares difficult (es-
pecially for Anaconda). From the point of view of the Chilean government,
negative features included the fall in Chile's share of world copper production
from 20.2 per cent in 1934 to 19.2 per cent in 1944—46 and to 11.8 per cent
in 1953—54, the drop in net returned value over the 1952—54 period of 16.7
per cent because of reduced sales, and the attenuation in the linkages of large-
scale mining to the rest of the economy.
In 1955, therefore, the large-scale copper mining companies and the
Chilean government agreed on a Nuevo Trato ("new deal") for large-scale
copper mining. The Nuevo Trato was a considerable rationalization and lib-
eralization of the treatment of large-scale copper. This agreement changed the
regime in a number of significant respects: (i) All previous charges were re-
placed by a single direct tax on profits. (ii) The basic tax rate was to be 50
per cent, with a surtax no greater than 25 per cent. The surtax was an inverse
function of quantities and became zero when production reached approximately
190 per cent of the 1949—53 levels (or 140 per cent of previous peak levels).
(iii) The limit on depreciation allowances was increased from 5 to 20 per cent
of the value of plant and equipment. (iv) Exchange-rate discrimination against
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corporation(Corporación del Cobre; CODELCO) was established to create
national expertise in copper, control exports and quantities, encourage the use
e of local factors of production, and prepare statistics.
S The Nuevo Trato was the basic law governing large-scale copper mining
for more than a decade. Changes were made during that time, but they did not
modify the basic character of the regime. After a few years, however, dissatis-
faction once again was widespread. Many Chileans thought that too many
benefits had been given to the companies.26 On the other hand, the companies
wanted further guarantees before they expanded their capacities. They shelved
new investment plans in 1960 and 1961 because the government would not
agree to a twenty-year guarantee against changes in the tax rates and against
expropriation. In late 1961, after an impasse had been reached, the legislature
responded by authorizing two special surtaxes totaling 13.0 per cent on the
profits of large-scale mining. The Socialist party also introduced a bill (which
was not passed) to nationalize large-scale copper mining with compensation
of $209 million in the form of 3.0 per cent, thirty-year bonds.
In the 1962—64 phase, discriminatory exchange-rate policy was reintro-
duced as transactions other than with large-scale mining were shifted from the
bank spot NER to the bank future NER (see section 3.2). In 1964 CODELCO
established a Chilean copper producers' price for use in Chilean sales instead
of the United States producer price.
In 1965—70 under the Frei government the frustrations with the results
of the Nuevo Trato culminated in several major changes:
Price policy was altered substantially. The Chilean producer price had
been established in 1964, but on the average the price for that year was 0.6
cents per pound less than the United States producer price and 13.3 cents per
pound less than the LME (London Metal Exchange) price. On the average in
1965 the Chilean producer price was 0.7 cents per pound more than the United
States producer price, but was 23.2 cents per pound less than the LME price.
e In 1966, however, CODELCO broke sharply with the United States producer
price by establishing a Chilean price equal to the average of the LME spot and
future prices in August and to the LME future price in October. Subsequently,
in 1968, in agreement with the other major copper-exporting developing na-
tions (Zambia, Peru, and the Congo) the Chilean producer price was set equal
b to the LME spot price. As a result of these price changes, the Chilean producer
price per pound exceeded the monotonically increasing United States producer
price on the average by 18.0 cents in 1966, 11.7 cents in 1967, 11.4 cents in
1968, 19.1 cents in 1969, and 5.9 cents in 1970.27
The government raised taxrateson large-scale copper mining. In 1966 it
• established a 100 per cent surtax on the first 55,000 tons Sold at over 42 cents
per pound.28 In 1967 Law 16624 increased the direct-tax base rate from 50.0
.,108EVOLUTIONOF EXCHANGE CONTROL REGIMES IN RECENT DECADES
to 52.5percent. In 1968 the government levied a surtax according to a gradu-
ated scale for all sales at prices greater than 40 cents per pound, with the
marginal rate ranging from 54 per cent at 40 cents per pound to 70 per cent at
50 cents per pound and higher.
Much more fundamental changes occurred in regard to the control of
Chilean copper. In his 1964 election campaign, Frei had promised to seek a
large increase in copper production capacity and some kind of Chilean partici-
pation in the ownership of large-scale copper mining. Even before the in-
auguration, his representative, Raul Saez, began to negotiate with Kennecott.
In 1966, after long negotiations with each of the foreign companies involved
and equally long debates in Congress, large-scale copper mining was "Chilean-
ized" under Law 16425 and Decree Law 16624.
These laws included four major provisions. (i) Large-scale copper mining
capacity was to be expanded from 580,000 short tons in 1964 to 957,500 short
tons in 1970—72 with investments of $147 million in Anaconda properties,
$230 million in Kennecott properties, and $157 million in Cerro Corporation
properties.2° (ii) The Chilean government became a 51 per cent owner of El
Teniente (with 49 per cent remaining with Braden, a Kennecott subsidiary),
a 25 per cent owner of the new Anaconda venture at Exótica (but not of
Chuquicamata, the major Anaconda mine, nor of El Salvador), and a 25 per
cent owner of the RIo Blanco mine being developed with the Cerro Corpora-
tion. (iii) Base tax rates were lowered to 44 per cent for El Teniente, 52 per
cent on the Anaconda properties (but with accelerated depreciation and the
tax rebate for refining in Chile removed so that most benefits would not be
received until the late 1970s), and 15 per cent (plus 30 per cent on Cerro's
dividends) for the RIo Blanco venture. (iv) The share originating in Chile of
total world production of each company was not to be reduced when the
company's total world production fell.
Two years later, in June 1969, Chile nationalized the Anaconda proper-
ties of Chuquicamata and El Salvador. This nationalization gave the Chilean
government 51 per cent ownership as of January 1, 1970 (but with participa-
tion in profits as of September 1, 1969). The cost of the purchase of 51 per
cent ownership was $197 million to be paid in 24 semiannual installments at
6 per cent interest starting on June 30, 1970. The other 49 per cent was to be
purchased starting sometime after 1972 but before 1982 and continuing for
twelve years more on terms which were to depend on net profits after January
1,1970. Immediate government participation in profits was instituted for
prices above 40 cents per pound. Owing to this nationalization, in 1970 the
respective legal participation rates of the Chilean government in profits from
the two former Anaconda properties were 75.647 and 76.676 per cent plus
the surtax for prices above 40 cents per pound.
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quite critical of the terms of Chileanization and nationalization of copper under
the previous government. In his first month of office the Central Bank revoked
access to the bank future rate for any company entitled to only partial surrender
of its export proceeds. In his second month of office, Allende sent to Congress
a proposed constitutional reform which, together with a general affirmation of
the absolute dominion of the state over all subsoil deposits, established specific
mechanisms for the complete nationalization of large-scale copper mining. On
July 11, 1971, this constitutional reform was unanimously approved by Con-
gress. Five days later the state assumed complete control of the niines.
The constitutional amendment authorized the government to pay the
previous owners the book 30ofthe companies minus debts to the state,
unpaid taxes, alleged damage to the mines, and "excess profits" since the 1955
Nuevo Trato. This payment was to be made over a period of not more than
thirty years at an interest rate of not less than 3 per cent. An appeal procedure
was established with a special five-man copper tribunal8' (whose decision
would be final) for the foreign companies if they did not agree with the pay-
ments so determined. Subsequently the Chilean government publicly pledged
to pay off foreign-debt obligations, totaling more than $700 million, which had
been assumed by the companies in the large investment program for expanding
capacity initiated during the previous phase.32
On September 28, Allende stated that the two principal foreign copper
companies involved, Kennecott and Anaconda, owed Chile $774 million in
excess profits. On October 11, the Comptroller General announced that Kenne-
cott and Anaconda were due no compensation and that Cerro was due a com-
pensation of $14 Anaconda and Kennecott appealed these decisions
to the special tribunal. In August 1972 the tribunal disallowed the appeals of
the copper companies.
Meanwhile, another controversy arose. On December 31, 1971, Chile
failed to meet the first installment of $5.8 million in promissory notes due to
Kennecott because of still-pending decisions concerning the usefulness of the
investment undertaken with the proceeds of these notes. At the same time
Chile failed to meet a $14 million obligation due to Anaconda (at least in the
judgment of Anaconda) because the government interpreted the decision of
the Comptroller General to mean that such obligations were void. In response,
Anaconda and Kennecott sought and obtained United States court orders
embargoing the New York bank accounts of nine Chilean government agen-
cies. Chile reacted by embargoing all remaining properties of the two compa-
nies in Chile, but also announced it would honor $84.6 million of the $92.7
million in promissory notes held by Kennecott.34 In 1972 and 1973, in further
reaction to the nationalization and debt repayment issues, the United States
companies succeeded in obtaining court orders that delayed the unloading of
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4.2.2Other Exports.
In 1932 Law 5 107 established license requirements for all exports except
those from large-scale mining to ensure the return to the government of a pre-
determined sum of foreign exchange at a stipulated price or the return by
exporters of imports of "primary necessities" previously agreed upon. The
NERs for such exports were more favorable than those for large-scale copper
mining, but usually not as favorable as for many other imports (see section
3.2).
Throughout the next four decades the general characteristics of the re-
gimes for these exports remained basically the same, although the option of
using export proceeds directly for imports was not generally continued. Export
licenses were granted automatically if the exporter agreed to ship the exports
within a specified period, repatriate all the proceeds within a second specified
period after shipment, and liquidate them within a third specified period.36 As
is described in section 3.2, exports steadily were moved to higher NERs, al-
though the applicable PLD-NERs tended to decline.37 As is also indicated in
section 3.2, variations in the PLD-NERs among exports were at times quite
considerable. Baerresen [1966:3] claims that the favored exports were deter-
mined largely by political influence.
Three exceptions to the general export regimes have been important:
quotas on specific products, special regimes for traditional mining exports, and
special regimes to promote nontraditional exports:
Quotas on specific products(sometimescompletely prohibitory) have
been a part of export policy since the early I 930s. Their purpose has been to
ensure sufficient domestic supplies. The list of quota goods has been changed
on the average at least once a year. The quotas have primarily been on agri-
cultural and food products, although the export of other industrial products
also has been constrained at times.38 The government has tended to use such
restrictions more when the over-all regime has been relatively restrictive. Even
during the most liberal phases, however, quotas have been enforced on specific
products in short supply—especially after poor harvests of agricultural com-
modities. Such quotas have been very important for the affected commodities39
but generally have not been very broad in their impact.
The most important special regime for traditional mining exports (except
for large-scale copper mining, on which see subsection 4.2.1, above) has been
that for nitrates. In fact, the very first important special regime, established in
1931, was for the nitrate industry, which had once been dynamic, but by then
was ailing.40 In 1931 a monopoly (CompañIa de Salitre de Chile) controlling
approximately 95 per cent of Chilean nitrate production was formed to attempt
(unsuccessfully) to affect world nitrate prices. There was a strong negative
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lionin Guggenheim financial obligations. In any case, President Alessandri
dissolved the company in 1933.
In 1934 Law 5340 ratified an agreement between nitrate enterprises and
the government which established the basic framework for the special regime
in nitrates that was to prevail for the next several decades. This law created the
Nitrate and Iodine Marketing Corporation (Corporación de Venta de Salitre y
• Yodo; CONVENSA) with representatives of both the nitrate enterprises and
the government (the latter had veto power) on its board of directors. CON-
VENSA was given monopoly power over Chilean nitrate sales and entered into
the international nitrate cartel. The government was to receive 25 per cent of
• the profits. Among other things, the major nitrate enterprises received exemp-
tions from indirect taxes on their imports of equipment, machinery, fuel, elec-
• trical detonators, chemical imports, and containers. Indirect taxes on nitrate
exports—once a major source of government revenue—were eliminated. Thus,
• a long-enduring policy of subsidizing production and exports of nitrates by
special tax exemptions was begun, although such advantages may have been
more than off set by the overvalued exchange rate and the government share of
profits, at least in more recent years (see the estimates of the nitrate EPRs in
section 5.2,below).
Subsequently, further benefits were added,41 and the name was changed
•
in 1968 to the Chemical and Mining Company of Chile (Sociedad QuImica y
Minera de Chile S.A.; SOQUIM). The basic characteristic of the special re-
gime for nitrates, nevertheless, has remained the same since the 1930s. In the
1960s and early 1970s, it accounted for 6 to 7 per cent of all imports under
special regimes. In the late 1960s it was also one of the primary beneficiaries
of the drawback program discussed below.
A second important special regime for traditional mining exports has been
thatfor small- and medium-scale copper mining. This sector has been under
Chilean ownership and control since before the War of the Pacific, at which
time it accounted for as much as 40 per cent of total world production. Provi-
sions of this special regime have included tax exemptions and special invest-
ment credits.42 In 1970 it accounted for 8 per cent of total imports under
p special regimes.
Special regimes to promote nontraditional exports have existed since the
1930s. In that decade, some exporters, as is noted above, were free to utilize
their foreign-exchange proceeds directly. Gold exports, for another example,
were made at a favorable NER.
A number of special regimes established in the early and mid-1950s also
incorporated an element of export promotion. In 1953 the fishing industry was
allowed directly to utilize the foreign exchange it generated. Drawbacks were
given for products made exclusively from raw materials originating in Arica,
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regimes (see subsection 4.1.5.1). Special favorable NERs for gold and wine
also were available (see section 3.2).
Starting in the late 1 950s, however, more general attempts at export pro-
motion were initiated. In 1958 Law 12861 established a special regime for
specific exports including (i) exemptions from indirect taxes and customs duties
on material inputs applied to operations directly concerned with exports; (ii)
rebates of taxes if an exporter could demonstrate that they affected the cost
of his exports; and (iii) automatic refunds of taxes, after exportation, at fixed
percentages of f.o.b. values, ranging from 0.015 per cent for copper or brass
plates or sheets to 26.8 per cent for bulk wine shipments (but from 3 to 6 per
cent for most other products). In 1960 these tax exemptions were modified. In
1961 special pre- and post-shipment credits were a new
regime designed to increase exports was established for foreign capital invest-
ments.44 Also in 1963 new lines of preshipment credit were established for
agricultural and nontraditional exports.45
Despite these greatly expanded provisions, export promotion was not
notably successful in the early 1960s. Agricultural exports for 1960—64 re-
mained at about the 1955-59 level. Industrial exports other than of copper
declined from 1959 through 1963, although they rose in 1964.
The Frei government, therefore, created a new export-promotion regime.
Its basis was established in 1966 by Law 16528 and Central Bank Circular
734. The provisions of Law 16528 included the following: (i) For a specific
list of 46 refunds of up to 30 per cent of the c.i.f. or f.o.b. value were
made on the basis of tax incidence. (ii) The list or the percentage rates could
be increased at any time, but could be decreased only after three years.47 (iii)
Foreign exchange from such exports was converted into escudos at the most
favorable legal rate from the point of view of the exporter as of the date of
export or the date of the return of the export proceeds (at the choice of the
exporter).
Central Bank Circular 734 established two types of export-promotion
credits: (i) preshipment credits in domestic currency for 126 specific products
for up to 80 per cent of the f.o.b. value for 180 days at 9 per cent interest, re-
financed entirely by the Central Bank;48 and (ii) postshipment credits in
foreign exchange for a smaller group of products for up to 80 per cent of the
f.o.b. value for from 180 days (lowered to 90 days in July 1967) to two and a
half years at 9 per cent interest, refinanced entirely by the Central Bank. For
those 52 mostly industrial products eligible for both pre- and postshipment
credits, the latter cancelled the former.
In late 1966 Decree 1224 of the Ministry of Economics implemented the
new regime. It created a list of about two hundred new drawback rates ranging
from 0.282 per cent to 29.29 per cent.49 Products with rates over 10.0 per cent
included bulk wine, 29.29 and 27.787 per cent; calcium carbonate, ferromag-
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e nesium, and ferrosilic magnesium, 26.0 per cent; newsprint, 20 per cent; cham-
pagne and cider, 18.838 per cent; ferrosilicone, 18.0 per cent; bottled wine,
- 14.038per cent; and lead minerals and lead concentrates, 11.127 per cent.
r Subsequently, more items were added to the list until in mid-1969 it
s totaled 331 products. Jul [1969: 114—i 17] distinguishes three categories of
) listedproducts: (i) Group A—those items on the list as of October 1964 which
legally had to be retained at least at the same rates; (ii) Group B—products in-
d cluded explicitly by Law 16528 or by petition of some government agency "for
reasons independent of the promotion of 50and(iii) Group C—
products included for export promotion after the completion of technical
En studies concerning their potential. In 1966, 1967, and 1968, the respective
shares of total drawbacks accounted for by each of these three categories were
as follows: A—10, 10, and 3 per cent; B—.-80, 65, and 66 per cent (with fish
meal and fish flour alone accounting for 60, 34, and 27 per cent); and C—
10, 25, and 30 per cent (with agricultural and sea products alone accounting
for 5, 18, and 23 per cent). An increasing but small proportion of the draw-
backs, thus, was devoted to products in which Chile was deemed to have
potentialcomparative advantage.
In 1969 Decree 124 of the Ministry of Economics lowered the rates for
40 products and eliminated the rates entirely for 160, primarily in Group A.
These reductions were allowed because the rate of increase in the exchange
k ratehad exceeded the rate of increase in the relevant domestic price index.
Selowsky [1971:9] reports that the major drawbacks in effect after this modi-
were for paper and fish flour (30 per cent); steel and iron (26 per
cent); wood (24 per cent); wool (22 per cent); matted rye, fresh fruits, and
oils (20 per cent); cardboard, semi-elaborated copper, and beans (16 per
cent); onions and garlic (14 per cent); frozen fish products, cellulose, and
ferromolybdenum (12 per cent); and molybdenum oxide (9 per cent). Accord-
ing to unpublished Central Bank data, the distribution of drawbacks across
sectors for 1969—70 was 23.0 per cent for agriculture, 16.5 per cent for mining,
50.4 per cent for industry, and 9.6 per cent for others. Paper and related
products, food products (including fish meal and oils), and nitrates accounted
0 respectively for 24.2, 19.3, and 11.7 per cent of the total.
C In mid-1969 preshipment credits accounted for about 0.6 per cent of
total credits. They were distributed primarily to cement (33 per cent), agricul-
tural products (22 per cent), sea products (18 per cent), vehicle parts (17 per
cent),51 and paper products (11 per cent). At that time, $104,273 in post-
shipment credits were outstanding (equal to 0.6 per cent of the value of pro-
• moted exports in 1969). They were distributed primarily to machinery parts
(55 per cent), chemical products (29 per cent), wood products (9 per cent),
• and bronze products (8 per cent).
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drawbacks and credits to promote exports and to help provide a protective
buffer, between world markets and exporters. In 1971 a number of decrees of
the Ministry of Economics and Circulars of the Central Bank generally in-
creased the scope of the drawback system and of the pre- and postshipment
credit programs. In that year drawbacks increased approximately 50 per cent
in constant escudo terms.52
4.3POLICIES FOR OTHER INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC TRANSACTIONS
Basic characteristics of these policies include the following:
i. Tourism and other personal expenditures have been treated as non-
essential luxuries and have been among the first to be restrained at times of
foreign-exchange shortages. As a result, the pattern of restraints on these
expenditures has coincided quite closely with the over-all restrictiveness of
foreign-sector policies.
ii. A number of regimes for foreign investment have prevailed in recent
decades. The regulations in these regimes often have been quite specific, and
many agreements have been negotiated on a case-by-case basis. A basic objec-
tive of most of them is to limit short-term capital movements. This concern,
perhaps somewhat paradoxically, has resulted in much greater constraints
being placed on capital repatriation and related payments for new investments
than for large-scale copper mining.
iii. There was a resurgence of capital inflows on government account
after 1955 as part of stabilization and public works programs. As a result, for-
eign debt increased to one of the highest per capita levels in the world in the
1960s and early 1970s. Therefore, debt payments and debt renegotiations have
• greatly constrained the options of recent governments.
• Three features of NER policies for nongoods transactions should be noted
(for details, see section 5.1.1): (i) The applicable NERs generally have been
higher than those for most goods trade. (ii) The applicable NERs generally
have been increased earlier than those for most goods trade at times of foreign-
exchange crises. (iii) The gap between the NERs for goods and for nongoods
transactions has narrowed in the early part of all of the more liberal phases.
To obtain EERS for nongoods transactions, of course, other policies must
be considered, for example, indirect tax policy. As the following brief review
of tax policy suggests, tax rates became significantly high only in recent years.
• In August 1954 a tax of 0.0 15 escudos per dollar was levied on non-
• merchandise international transactions. At that time it was equivalent to a 9.4
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toa 1.9 per cent tax. In August 1956, a 1 per cent tax was established. It was
increased to 5 per cent in January 1957, reduced to 1 per cent in July 1957,
increased to 2 per cent in February 1958, and abolished in April 1959. In
1964 a 4.0 per cent tax was applied on all purchases of exchange in the brokers'
market (except those for which the Central Bank had approved a transfer
application). The tax was increased to 6.0 per cent in July 1966, to 10 per
cent in January 1967, to 15.15 per cent in January 1970, and to 33.15 per cent
in March 1971. In late 1969 the tax was extended to cover capital imported
in the form of foreign exchange and re-exported within a year of entry (as well
as any related interest and profits on such capital). The minimum waiting
period for avoiding this tax was increased to 18 months in May 1970 and
eliminated entirely in December of that year.
Most nontax policies affecting nongoods transactions have varied sub-
stantially among the different categories of such In the rest of
this section, policies for some of these major categories are reviewed.
4.3.1Tourism and Other Invisibles and Imports for Personal Use.
In recent years quantitative limits on this category of foreign-exchange
use have been modified quite frequently. In May 1964, for example, maximum
foreign-exchange allocations for travel were established at $300 for Latin
American trips and $1,000 for all others. During the foreign-exchange shortage
of 1965 these maximums were reduced. In September 1966 they were in-
In the last half of 1968 they were reduced below the 1965 levels. In
May 1969 they were increased to the 1966 levels. Between June and September
1970 the Central Bank openly ignored the limits. In October 1970 the maxi-
mums were again lowered; at the same time, children under seven were allowed
only 50 per cent of the maximum, and a minimum period of 30 days between
purchases was established.
Under the Allende government the maximum travel allocations generally
were reduced, and the restrictions were made more specific. In November
1970, for example, Central Bank Circular 1454 established maximums of $100
(but no more than $25 per day) for travel within 500 kilometers of the Chilean
border, $300 (with a maximum of $30 a day) for travel to other parts of Latin
America and the Caribbean, $480 (with a maximum of $30 a day) for travel
to the United States and Canada, and $720 (with a maximum of $30 a day)
for travel beyond the Western Hemisphere.55 During the next year a series of
Central Bank circulars lowered these limits by 25 to 40 per cent, established an
annual total maximum of $540, and introduced more complicated adminis-
trative procedures for travelers. Also, the export of Chilean bank notes was
limited to 20 per cent of the travel allocation for residents and was prohibited
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foreign currency that they brought into Chile and to exchange a minimum of
$10 per day for adults and $5 per day for children ($8 and $4 per day, re-
spectively, for stays of over a week)
Quantitativerestrictions on foreign exchange for other personal uses fol-
lowed the same general pattern over time as did those on travel. The limits in
effect early in the Allende regime are suggestive of the types of transactions so
restricted: $100 a month (with an annual maximum of $600) for each bene-
ficiary of family maintenance; $50 a month for books, $200 a year for peri-
odicals; $50 a year for student registration fees; $50 a month for medicine not
available in Chile; $1,200 a year for previously contracted insurance premiums;
approval of the Superintendency of Insurance for newly contracted insurance
premiums; and to obtain foreign exchange for medical treatment abroad, certi-
fication of the need for such treatment plus a per cent deposit guarantee.
4.3.2Foreign Investment Other Than in Large-Scale Copper Mining.
Ellsworth [1945:79] claims that a conscious campaign to reduce the
rights of foreign investors was pursued vigorously in the 1930s. As supporting
evidence, he points to the above-mentioned attempts to establish a state trading
monopoly in petroleum and to obtain national ownership and control in the
nitrate industry. The default on foreign-debt payments in 1931 (see below)
and the existence of exchange control also may have discouraged foreign in-
vestment. The prospects for attracting substantial new net foreign investment
before the late 1940s were dim in any case, however, because of the Great
Depression and the Second World War.
In the early postwar period, as is described in section 3.2, more favorable
NERs were allowed for capital inflows in the form of foreign exchange. In late
1950, moreover, transfer guarantees for foreign investment registered upon
entry were introduced in a further attempt to encourage foreign direct invest-
ment. CORFO also was attempting to facilitate such investment by providing
information and other services.
In late 1953 a government decree substantially modified the terms under
which new foreign capital could be brought into Chile. Such capital was granted
favorable treatment when invested in export industries that could compete on
the international market without government assistance; in production for the
domestic market of goods that had previously been imported; or in industries
in which at least 80 per cent of the raw materials were Chilean in origin and
were used in the production of goods for the domestic market at reduced cost
to the consumer. The Foreign Investment Commission supervised each appli-
cation on a case-by-case basis and decided whether or not a particular appli-
cant met the necessary conditions and, if so, exactly what the nature of the
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andexemptions were allowed: (i) repatriation of' capital after five years in
annual quotas not exceeding 20 per cent per year of the value of the invest-
ment; (ii) transfer abroad of earnings on the investment for a period of at
least ten years and possibly up to twenty years; (iii) exemption from all cus-
toms duties and charges on imported machinery and equipment; (iv) a guar-
lfl antee that no applicable taxes would be changed for at least ten years; (v) free-
SO dom for at least ten years from price-fixing regulations and from controls
affecting industries in which the investments were made; (vi) the right to re-
evaluation of capital for tax purposes in accordance with exchange-rate
fluctuations; and (vii) the rights and exemptions in ii and vi above for the
15, reinvestment of earnings on such capital.
Decree Law 258 of 1960 (supplemented by Decree Law 1272 of 1962)
established more favorable terms for bringing some capital into Chile. This
te. decree covered new capital brought into Chile in the form of foreign currency,
credits, or plant and equipment for the purpose of introducing, developing, im-
proving, or resuming activities related to agriculture, mining, fishing, or any
be other industry officially defined to be in the national interest. Such capital was
exempted from all customs duties and fees on related imported machinery and
g equipment. It also could receive many specific presidential decree privileges
be and guarantees for ten years (and in special cases, twenty years), covering
such matters as future taxation, depreciation allowances, withdrawal of capital,
and remittances of profits.
In 1962 Decree Law 1272 established an alternative set of regulations
under which capital brought into the country in the form of foreign exchange
could be sold freely in the brokers' market after registration with the Central
Bank. These regulations included a nontransferable guarantee of free with-
te drawal of principal through the brokers' market, but prior authorization by
the Central Bank was required for remittance of profits or interest. The foreign
investor also could enter into a capital participation agreement with a Chilean
entity and have the option of the bank or the brokers' market for entry and
subsequent exit of capital and related flows (but exit had to take place in the
same market as that chosen for entry), subject to a minimum investment
Id period of three years.
In 1966 the Central Bank modified Decree Law 1272: foreign exchange
for repatriation of all earnings on imported capital would be guaranteed under
this decree provided that (i) the investment was deemed to be of importance
to the Chilean economy; (ii)it had a value of at least $100,000; (iii) the
capital stayed in the country for at least three years and subsequent repatria-
- tionoccurred at a maximum rate of 20 per cent per year; (iv) the exchange
- wassold in the bank market; and (v) the interest rate on credit to Chilean
•e firms did not exceed the rate prevailing in the domestic market of the investor.
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other policies of this phase: export promotion, minimization of transitory
capital movements, and governmental control over the form of capacity ex-
pansion in order to attempt to assure the most socially productive uses.
Under the Allende government, official policy was to encourage foreign
investment, especially in mixed enterprises in which the government had ma-
jority control. Such investment, however, was subject to two important pro-
visos: that it did not replace domestic investment and that it helped in the
fulfillment of the economic plan. Foreign concerns which already operated in
the state area of activity or which were otherwise not consistent with the eco-
nomic goals of the government were to be nationalized.57
4.3.3Official Capital Flows and Foreign Debts.
Before the Great Depression Chile had considerable official foreign-debt
obligations (columns 12 and 13 in Table 1.1). With the Great Depression,
however, foreign sources quickly dried up. Payments on past debts soon were
depleting foreign-exchange reserves. Therefore, in mid-1931 Chile suspended
payments of the service charges on foreign debts. In 1936 such payments were
resumed at lower interest rates.
Over the next quarter-century or so, official capital inflows were wel-
comed. Sources included bilateral flows from the United States and Western
European countries and flows from international agencies such as the Inter-
national Monetary Fund.58 A large proportion of this capital was destined for
CORFO-sponsored projects or for stabilization funds related to the 1956 and
1959 attempts at stabilization plus liberalization. Official foreign debt:increased
substantially during the 1956—61 period because of the conscious decision to
finance continuing government deficits abroad in order to lessen short-run in-
flationary pressures. In the early 1960s the Alliance for Progress provided
further official inflows—which also increased the foreign debt (line 1.2.6.5 in
Table A.1).
At the start of the Frei administration, foreign-debt payments were of
considerable concern. Estimated debt-related obligations in 1965 of $367 mil-
lion—together with the estimated outflow of $114 million for profits and
amortization—would have absorbed almost 70 per cent of the value of exports
for that year. As a result the foreign economic regime in some respects was
made more restrictive at the start of 1965, as is discussed above. Chile suc-
cessfully renegotiated the payment of her foreign debt in that year. Immediately
thereafter the government became at least verbally concerned about contracting
any future foreign debt. In December 1966, for example, the government re-
nounced the acceptance of any more program loans from abroad—although
such loans apparently were being accepted again by mid-1967. Also in 1967
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mentwith the USSR for the equivalent of $57 million in credits at terms
apparently favorable to Chile.
In part because of the debt rescheduling in 1965, the Allende government
inherited a fairly large foreign debt—approximately $3 billion at the end of
1970. According to Minister of Finance Zorrilla [1970:1478,1489] (also see
Cauas and Corbo [1972:22] and Gunder-Frank [1972:16—18]), the aims of
policies regarding official capital flows and foreign debts were to honor past
obligations;reschedule payments on foreign loans; reduce future dependence
on foreign sources by resorting to them as little as possible and only under
centralized state procedures; diversify the sources utilized in the future; and
cease to be constrained by IMF policies and procedures.
Through most of 1971, Chile met her scheduled debt obligations. How-
ever, in November President Allende announced that Chile would request a
renegotiation of debt payments with a consolidation of payments, a three-year
grace period, and a long schedule of repayment.6° Debt payments due later in
that year were not made on schedule.61
In January and February 1972 Chile conducted negotiations in New York
with forty-four private United States banks to which Chile owed more than
$600 million. The result was a deferred schedule for payments due between
11- 1972 and 1974.
rn From February through April1972Chile conducted negotiations in Paris
r- with the so-cailed Paris Club (the United States and ten other major creditor
Dr nations) •62Asecret accord in April provided that Chile pay as scheduled 30
per cent of all the debt and interest payments due between November 1971
and December 1972, with six years' grace subsequently to pay those deferred
payments in full; the creditors promise to study "with good the refinancing
of those debt payments due in 1973; and the IMF periodically review Chile's
4d monetary, credit, and trade performance.
in In addition to debt renegotiation questions, another policy of the Allende
government in this area was to welcome official inflows both from traditional
sources, e.g., the IMF, the United States, and from new sources, e.g., the So-
/1- cialist nations (on the latter, see Chapter 8).
Id
4.3.4Miscellaneous Transactions.
Mostof the policiesdiscussed in this subsection did not have a strong
ty general impact nor a long-lasting one. At leastfor certainsubsectors, however,
g they were very important for a while. Their effects are discussed in Part III,
below.
In 1959 Law 13305 established a tax immunity for capital repatriated
7 from abroad to buy tax-exempt dollar bonds. It also granted banks the au-
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on foreign-currency time deposits. With the end of the Phase IV period, in
December 1961, these provisions were terminated.
In 1962 Law 14949 authorized the government to pay its internally held
dollar debts in escudos at the bank spot NER, which was about two-thirds of
the brokers' rate which would otherwise have been used.
In 1963 Law 15192 reserved all gold operations to the Central Bank.
Later that year the Central Bank announced that it would continue to buy gold
coins and bars from individuals and firms, but that it would sell gold only to
industrial and 'professional users associated with the bank and not to other
individuals and firms. In 1970 the exclusive power of the Central Bank to deal
in gold was extended to all nonjewelry imports.
In 1963, the Central Bank also began to limit the rate of interest allowable
on import credits for which it would provide foreign exchange. This maximum
was altered a number of times in the 1 960s until it was limited to the lower of
the prevalent interest rate in the country of export or 1.5 per cent above the
New York prime rate in 1969.
At the end of 1970 Central Bank Circular 1464 prohibited paying remu-
neration in foreign currency to Chileans or to non-Chileans of more than two
years' residence. It also prohibited paying more than half of such remuneration
in foreign currency to non-Chileans of less than two years' residence and then
only with Central Bank approval.
NOTES
I. These included specific taxes based on the 1928 law; ad valorem taxes of 3, 30,
or 62 per cent of the landed value; consular charges of 3 per cent; disembarkation and
embarkation charges or port charges of 1 per cent; special taxes on agricultural machinery
and parts, cotton, tea, sugar, gasoline, and related imports; additional taxes; and added
additional taxes.
2. For example, in February 1951, after the December 1950 reforms, CONDECOR
loosened the system further by publishing a reduced list of prohibited imports. Other
changes in 1951, however, increased the restrictions in a piecemeal fashion: the list of
luxuries which could be imported against gold sales was revised four times, with auto-
mobiles put on the prohibited list in the last revision; a new list of imports against the
proceeds of wine exports was published; and importation of certain commodities previ-
ously permitted from all countries was restricted to countries with which Chile had
payments or compensation agreements. In 1952, further restrictions were introduced: on
April 24, imports previously quantitatively uncontrolled at the bank spot rate or at fixed
rates were suspended or transferred to quantitatively controlled fixed rates (which effec-
tively was a reversal to the system in effect before the reforms of December 15, 1950); on
June 4, the importation of luxury items was suspended; and on June 26, an expanded list
of prohibited imports was published with exceptions to be made by CONDECOR if
domestic supplies were insufficient or if domestic costs were more than 50 per cent above
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3.Licenses continued not to be required for permitted imports, but registration with
the Foreign Exchange Commission at the time of shipment from abroad was necessary in
order to receive foreign-exchange cover.
4. Some of these results would occur with almost any rationing system. Others
might have been ameliorated with modifications in the system as itexisted, e.g., the
allowable percentage increase could be a function of past or planned growth in order not
to penalize the faster-growing activities so much.
5. Exceptions to this growing liberalization were primarily of a political nature. All
nonhumanitarian direct and indirect trade with Cuba was suspended between April 27,
1966, and November 19,1970. All direct and indirect nonhumanitarian trade with
Rhodesia was prohibited as of February 9, 1967. Direct and indirect nonhumanitarian
trade with the Union of South Africa was banned as of June 2, 1968, with a modification
as of March 5, 1968, to ban invisible transactions as well, but copper exports were
allowed!
6. For example, at the end of 1970 the importation for private use of automobiles
valued at over $2,500 (later reduced to $2,200) c.i.f. was prohibited.
7. Some other changes in the 1965—70 regime were motivated in large part by the
need to absorb liquidity: in June 1966, the establishment of a minimum downpayment of
20 per cent of the c.i.f. value for imports on a deferred payment basis (terminated in
September 1967); and establishment, in June 1967, of special terms with a rebate at a 5.0
per cent annual rate for exchange contracts for import payment cover negotiated at the
time of import registration (terminated in November 1970). The former requirement
also probably resulted in real costs to the importers.
8. After several months banks were limited to financing a maximum of 100 per cent
of deposits for category A, 60 per cent for category B, and 30 per cent for category C.
Financing of the other categories was not permitted. These percentages were reduced
in 1957.
9. Exceptions were made for some items on consignment, deposits made in dollars
or in 120-day no-interest Treasury dollar bonds, and some items in categories A, B,
and C.
10. A 5,000 per cent prior deposit for 90 days at a real interest rate of 10 per cent
cost the importer 125 per cent of the value of the import.
11. Exempt were the government, municipalities, exporters subject to the "free port"
and earthquake special regimes, large-scale mining, and imports from LAFTA countries.
12. The declining importance of prior deposits is indicated, for example, by the
steady fall in the ratios of the value of deposits to registered imports from 14.3 per cent
in 1964 to 2.9 per cent in 1968 (Joó [1969:17]). Ffrench-Davis [1971:1011 reports that
the value of imports requiring prior deposits decreased approximately 40 per cent in
1967 and another 40 per cent in 1968 to a level of only about 21 per cent of all imports
at the start of 1969.
13. This subsection is heavily based on the work of Jeanneret [1971:349—362].
Special regimes related primarily to exports are discussed in section 4.2.
14. A few special regimes do not fall into these categories. For example in 1960
Law 14117 established a special regime for reconstruction after the May 1960 earthquake
by permitting enterprises in the affected area to import machinery and equipment with
a single customs duty of 15.0 per cent of the c.i.f. value until 1965.
15. In the first ten months of 1970, for example, 34 per cent of the value of imports
under special regimes went to the department of Arica, 17 per cent to the provinces of
Chiloé, Aysen, and Magallenes, 16 per cent to the provinces of Tarapacá and Antofagasta,
and (under a different special regime) 7 per cent to the departments of Iquique, Pisagua,'
I
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Taltal, and Chanaral and the province of Antofagasta. A similar ordering occurred in
other years, although the position of the last two groups was at times reversed.
16. Arica borders on Peru, was won in the War of the Pacific, has about 0.6 per
cent of Chile's population, and is1,500 kilometers (900 miles) across the Atacama
desert from Santiago.
17. Some prohibited import items, such as most vehicles, could be imported for
use in the special areas alone, but could not be shipped to the rest of the country.
18. Recently there have been some exceptions to this statement. For example, in
1970 Law 17382 established a tax of 8.0 per cent on the customs value of goods imported
through Chiloé. After the1971 devaluation, moreover, the southern area received
favorable exchange-rate treatment for imports already registered and for certain newly
registered imports. Also in 1971 a special point system was established for automobile
imports into this area, with positive weights given to the age of any currently owned
vehicles, the number of years' residence in the zone, family income, and the number
of quarters in which applications had been filed (all subject to the limit of $2,200 c.i.f.
in value and the existence of appropriate repair and service facilities for the vehicle
being imported).
19. Fontaine [19641 concludes that the net economic benefits from the sugar in-
dustry set up under this shelter were negative.
20. For example. the original ratio of the rate for A account transactions to that
for B account transactions in the agreement with France was 0.463.
21. Import premiums commanded by any licensing under such agreements generally
were, of course, less than those which "free-foreign-exchange" licenses would command.
22. To illustrate, at the end of 1953 accounting dollars established under the terms
of payments agreements with the Federal Republic of Germany and Brazil, implied
respective rates of 38 and 28 per cent above the dominant bank spot rate, and the free-
sterling rate implied a cross exchange rate 35.3 per cent above the spot rate, which had
increased to 158 per cent by October 1954.
23. Ellsworth [1945:95—961 reports that because of this funding, CORFO's out-
standing loans at the end of 1942 already were approximately double the combined
total of all the other development agencies, even though the other organizations had been
in existence much longer and had substantial resources at their disposal derived from
mandatory Central Bank loans.
24. Difficult decisions remain to be made for petrochemical production, automobiles
and trucks, and chemicals and pharmaceuticals, but progress has been much more rapid
than had been anticipated in many quarters. See, for example, Novitski [1972].
25. However, large-scale copper mining continued to enjoy the third and fourth
components of the exchange-rate treatment outlined, above. Moreover, this subsector
was exempted from prior deposits on imports, additional taxes, and added taxes.
26. In subsection 7.1.2.3, I evaluate both the short- and the long-run effects of the
Nuevo Trato.
27. However, the Chilean producer price was below the United States producer
price for some time after July 1970.
28. However, the additional taxes of 5 and 8 per cent which bad been established
in 1961 were eliminated in 1966.
29. Of the investments in Anaconda properties, $58.8 million were from the United
States Export-Import Bank, $5.75 million were from the Chilean government, and the
rest from Anaconda. For the Kennecott properties $110 million were from the United
States Export-Import Bank and guaranteed by the Chilean government, $27.5 million
were from the Chilean government, and $92.7 million were on loan from Kennecott and
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insuredby AID (but of that $80 million in fact were from the Chilean government as
the price of 51 per cent control). For the Cerro Corporation properties, $56.4 million
were from the Export-Import Bank with a Chilean government guarantee on $35.4
million and $20.1 million were from a Japanese consortium with a Chilean government
guarantee on $10.1 million.
30. Hector Humeres, the politically independent Comptroller General, subsequently
estimated the book value to be $629 million.
• 31. The tribunal was composed of a representative of the Chilean Supreme Court,
a representative of the court of appeals, and three officials named to their posts by
Allende.
32. Welles [1971] reports that these debts amounted to $550 million of principal
• (including $180 million to the Export-Import Bank, $92 million to Kennecott, $100
4 million to five major New York financial institutions—Chase Manhattan, Manufacturers
Hanover Trust, Chemical Trust, First National City, and Morgan Guaranty Trust—$50
million to the Banca Commerciale Italiana, $18 million to the Cerro Corporation, $15
million to the Japanese Mitsui group, $17 million to the Japanese Sumimoto group, plus
some smaller obligations), plus $220 million in interest.
33. Adding to the confusion was a statement by Chilean Foreign Minister Clodomire
Almeyda in Washington on October 7 (after Allende's announcement of the excess-
profit estimate, but before the announcement of the decision of the Comptroller General)
that suggested that Kennecott and Anaconda would be assessed 49 per cent of their
excess profits since that was their share in the ownership of the mines prior to the 1971
nationalization (see Welles [1971]). De Onis [197la, l97le] claims that in May Allende
committed himself to signing a negotiated settlement for $56 million for the purchase
of the Cerro properties. However, he reversed his decision and never signed the agree-
• ment partly because militants in the government coalition were dissatisfied with terms
of the agreement and partly because the U.S. Export-Import Bank refused to grant Chile
a credit of $21 million to purchase Boeing airplanes.
•' 34. After surveys by French and Soviet mining experts, $8.1 million were deducted
from the original sum of $92.7 million because that much was judged not to have been
usefully invested.
• 35. The post-Allende government has indicated that it might reconsider the question
of compensation for the former owners, but not the possibility of returning control to
• them.
• 36. The period for shipment usually was 60 days. The period for repatriation varied
from 30 to 90 days, depending somewhat upon the restrictiveness of the over-all regime.
The period for liquidation generally was tO days. Longer periods were allowed for certain
promoted exports, e.g., in 1970 the shipment limit was 120 days for wood, 180 days for
industrial goods and minerals, and 360 days for iron ores, and the repatriation limit
e rangedfrom 120 to 480 days for exports on consignment and for specified processed
p
exports. Penalties were imposed for delayed returns. Such penalties were increased during
the more restrictive phases. Not all of these time limits were enforced all the time,
however.
37. In some cases, such as for gold and wine exports, even the NERs fell.
38. For example, in February 1971 Decree 33 of the Ministry of Economics pro-
hibited the export of industrial products through June of that year. In January 1972,
Decree 27 of the same ministry prohibited the export of certain iron products through
June of that year.
39. Because of the existence of such quotas, export prices of the constrained com-
modities have at times exceeded domestic prices, but Chileans have not been able to124EVOLUTIONOF EXCHANGE CONTROL REGIMES IN RECENT DECADES
arbitrage. In such cases the ratio of foreign to domestic prices overstates the EER because
it includes the premium received by the quota recipients.
40. The secular decline in the Chilean share of world nitrate production has been
huge: from 66 per cent in 190 1—02 to 1.5 per cent in 1960.
41. For example, in 1956 Law 12018 allowed CONVENSA to include amortization,
interest, and transportation in its production costs, guaranteed a better NER, and estab-
lished an investment program for the industry.
42. For example, this subsector received the special credits from the United States
that were negotiated in the Washington Treaty of 1951 (see subsection 4.2.1).
43. Credits were made available to favored exporters either 90 days before ship-
ment for up to 100.0 per cent of the returns at 4.0 per cent or with the presentation
of shipping documents for 180 days for up to 100.0 per cent of the returns at 3.0 per
cent. In November 1961, such credits were extended only to exporters who did not
have time deposits in the banking system.
44. This regime included guarantees on access to various exchange rates and on
the speed of capital withdrawal. Incoming capital was sold in the brokers' market and
servicing and withdrawal was in the bank market. Remittance of profits or interest of
up to 7.0 per cent per year of the invested capital was permitted. Withdrawal was allowed
to start two years after entry in annual amounts up to 12.5 per cent of the invested
capital, subject to the restriction that the total of servicing and withdrawal did not exceed
50 per cent of the increase in repatriated export proceeds.
45. For eligible exports, credit was available in domestic currency equal to 80 per
cent of the value for a maximum of 90 days (increased, a year later, to 180 days for
industrial products). This credit was refinanced in its entirety by the Central Bank.
46. This list did not include exports from large-scale mining, those which entered
the country under special exemptions, semimanufactured copper products, nitrates (until
1968), or services (except for shipping which was added later).
47. However, after January 1967, downward adjustments in the rates were allowed
as long as they were not greater than the amount by which the rate of increase in the
exchange rate exceeded the rate of increase in the wholesale price index. At the end
of 1968 the maximum downward adjustments were limited to the amount by which the
rate of increase in the exchange rate exceeded the rate of increase in the consumer price
index, except that fish meal and fish oil were guaranteed no decrease for three years.
48. The interest rate later was increased to 12 per cent, but still was below the
rate of change of prices; so this credit carried a negative real interest rate. The period
for this credit was increased to 360 days in December 1967. The periods in use in 1969
were 90 days for agricultural products, 180 days for most industrial products, and 360
days for cement sent to Argentina and Brazil.
49. A large portion of these new rates established an inverse relation between the
drawback rate and the international copper price for small- and medium-scale copper
mining. This decree also maintained the previously existing drawbacks at least at the
same levels.
50. Among these products were fish meal and oil, paper for periodicals, cellulose,
and cardboard, included as a result of solicitations by CORFO prompted by low in-
ternational prices; steel, as a result of solicitation by the Minister of Economics because
of low domestic prices for CAP; shipping, because of losses suffered by the merchant
marine; and nitrates, because in 1968, a transfer was arranged to SOQUIM of $5 million
in drawbacks, to take place over a period of three years.
51. In early 1970, however, all products of the automobile industry were excluded
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52. The impact of the export-promotion attempts is examined further in chapters
5,7, and 11, below.
L 53.Some other general policies also have applied, but have been relatively Un-
important for the purposes of this study. For example, since 1963 private persons buying
exchange in the brokers' market have been required to show proof of prior income tax
b
payments.
- 54.At about the same time the tax of 30 escudos a trip on travel by Chilean residents
to other Latin American countries was abolished and the tax on travel to all other
locations was increased from 60 to 310 escudos a trip.
55. The relative shift in these maximums favored travel to Latin America and dis-
criminatecl against travel to the United States and Canada. This shift was consistent with
the over-all aims of the Allende government regarding changes in the geographical
pattern of international economic and political interactions.
56. These last measures were in part directed at limiting black-market activity in
escudos.
57. The value of United States investment alone (including large-scale mining) at
the time of the election of Allende was over a billion dollars. The largest nonmining
operations included Anglo-Lautaro Nitrate, Boise Cascade, International Telephone and
Telegraph, Coca-Cola, Standard Oil of New Jersey, General Motors, Crown Zellerbach
International, General Cable, and RCA International, all of which had 1968 Chilean
sales of about $10 million at the least, although some were owned partially by Chilean
entities. See Szulc [1970] for a complete listing of such enterprises and their sales value.
58. Imports financed by those flows were at times exempted from some import
regulations such as the additional taxes and prior deposits.
59. In the case of large-scale copper mining the nature of such official obligations
itil was redefined, however, as is indicated above in subsection 4.2.1.
60. In his announcement Allende noted that in the previous six months the foreign
debt actually had been reduced; the foreign debt inherited from the previous government
be plus the $728 million in obligations taken over from the foreign copper companies made
Chile second only to Israel in terms of per capita national debt; and debt payment
be obligations for 197 1—1973 were approximately 40 per cent of total Chilean exports.
Furthermore, he claimed that the fulfillment of Chile's scheduled debt payment commit-
ment to date had been made much more difficult by its failure to receive more than
$100 million in dividends and taxes from the foreign copper companies prior to nation-
alization; the closing of approximately $190 million in credit lines by United States
69 banks in part because of the Edward Bank's failure to fulfill its contractual obligations;
60 the drop in international copper prices; and the increase in imports due to the boom in
the Chilean economy and to income redistribution. See CORFO [1971a, November 23:
be 1—2].
er 61. These included $5.8 million to Kennecott (see subsection 4.2.1, above), $6
he million to International Telephone and Telegraph Company, $7.8 million to United States
banks, and $4.5 million to the United States Export-import Bank. For more details,
see de Onis [1972b], Vüskovic [1972:544], and Wilcke [1972].
62. The United States held over half of the debt. No other individual country nor
all international organizations considered together held as much as a tenth.
t
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